Scan report
grafana / loki
Could an attacker exploit mistakes in this code?
Strong warning signs. Do not run or install this without a careful review.
- High
- 24
- Medium
- 225
- Low
- 29
Sources: Bandit, Semgrep, pip-audit
Does this code look like it is trying to cause harm?
Real issues worth reviewing before you rely on this code.
- High
- 35
- Medium
- 3
- Low
- 21
Sources: YARA, ClamAV, GuardDog, dependency checker
- Likely real
- 180
- Uncertain
- 52
- Likely noise
- 105
The risk classifier rates every finding for how likely it is to be a real issue. Likely noise still counts, just much less.
What we found, in plain English
This repository has two major security issues that are serious enough to prevent safe use. The most critical problem is that the code contains severe insecure coding patterns, specifically missing mutex locks and unencrypted gRPC connections, which means attackers could easily crash the system or steal data without any encryption. While there are also signs of potential malicious intent, such as suspicious URLs and obfuscated strings, these do not appear to be intentional attacks but rather common mistakes found in vendor code. The scan reported a vulnerability risk score of 514.0, which indicates a high level of danger due to the critical security flaws present in the application logic.
Written by a local language model from the findings below. The risk scores come from the classifier, not from this summary.
Detections by engine
Score over time
Overall score each time this repository was scanned.
Findings
Highest severity first. Select a finding to see the code and what it means.
Large result: showing the top 262 of 337 findings (up to 200 per engine, most severe and most likely real first). Totals above include everything.
-
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/logql/internal/logqltest/exec_query_frontend.go line 99
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Found an insecure gRPC server without 'grpc.Creds()' or options with credentials. This allows for a connection without encryption to this server. A malicious attacker could tamper with the gRPC message, which could compromise the machine. Include credentials derived from an SSL certificate in order to create a secure gRPC connection. You can create credentials using 'credentials.NewServerTLSFromFile("cert.pem", "cert.key")'.
schedulerServer := grpc.NewServer() -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/ruler/storage/instance/manager.go line 343
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Missing mutex unlock (`m.mut` variable) before returning from a function. This could result in panics resulting from double lock operations
wg.Done() -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/ruler/base/manager.go line 282
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Missing mutex unlock (`r.userManagerMtx` variable) before returning from a function. This could result in panics resulting from double lock operations
level.Debug(r.logger).Log("msg", "user manager shut down", "user", user) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/storage/stores/shipper/indexshipper/downloads/util.go line 68
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Missing `RUnlock` on an `RWMutex` (`m.mtx` variable) lock before returning from a function
return nil -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/engine/internal/obslock/obslock.go line 159
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Missing mutex unlock (`o.mu` variable) before returning from a function. This could result in panics resulting from double lock operations
return Guard{ Wait: wait, release: func() { hold := time.Since(holdStart) o.mu.Unlock() o.m.observeHold(o.name, modeWrite, reason, hold) }, } -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/engine/internal/obslock/obslock.go line 122
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Missing mutex unlock (`o.mu` variable) before returning from a function. This could result in panics resulting from double lock operations
return Guard{ Wait: wait, release: func() { hold := time.Since(holdStart) o.mu.Unlock() o.m.observeHold(o.name, modeWrite, reason, hold) }, } -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/setup-k3d/action.yaml line 10
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
A `run:` step pipes the output of `curl` or `wget` directly into a shell interpreter. This is the "curl | bash" install pattern — if the remote server is compromised or the URL is hijacked, an attacker can execute arbitrary code in your CI runner. Consider downloading the file first, verifying its checksum or signature, and then executing it.
run: | curl -s https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rancher/k3d/main/install.sh | bash -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/ingester/ingester.go line 984
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Untrusted input could be used to tamper with a web page rendering, which can lead to a Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability. XSS vulnerabilities occur when untrusted input executes malicious JavaScript code, leading to issues such as account compromise and sensitive information leakage. To prevent this vulnerability, validate the user input, perform contextual output encoding or sanitize the input. For more information, see: [Go XSS prevention] (https://semgrep.dev/docs/cheat-sheets/go-xss/).
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(err.Error())) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/logql-bench.yml line 115
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | go test \ -run=^$ -bench=LogQL/query=.+/kind=.+/store=${{ matrix.store }}$ \ ${{ inputs.instant_queries == true && '-range-type=instant' || '' }} \ -count=10 -timeout=5h -benchmem \ -cpuprofile=results/cpu.pprof \ -memprofile=results/mem.pprof \ | tee results/results.txt -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/logql-bench.yml line 70
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | STORES=() # Use explicit equality checks to avoid template injection. ${{ inputs.bench_chunks_v1 == true }} && STORES+=("chunk") ${{ inputs.bench_dataobj_old_engine == true }} && STORES+=("dataobj") ${{ inputs.bench_dataobj_new_engine == true }} && STORES+=("dataobj-engine") MATRIX_JSON=$(jq -nc --arg stores "${STORES[*]}" '{"store": $stores | split(" ")}') echo "matrix=$MATRIX_JSON" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/logql-correctness.yml line 106
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | case "${{ inputs.suite || (github.event_name == 'schedule' && 'exhaustive') || 'regression' }}" in exhaustive) SUITE="fast|regression|exhaustive" ;; regression) SUITE="fast|regression" ;; *) SUITE="fast" ;; esac go test \ -o results/bench.test \ -v -slow-tests -remote-transport=${{ matrix.remote_transport }} -timeout=60m \ -cpuprofile=results/cpu.pprof -memprofile=results/mem.pprof \ -run="TestStorageEquality/(${SUITE})/.*/kind=.+/store=${{ matrix.store }}$" \ ${{ matrix.range_type == 'instant' && '-range-type=instant' || '' }} \ ${{ inputs.failfast == true && '-failfast' || '' }} \ | tee results/results.txt -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /operator/hack/addon_grafana_gateway_ocp.yaml line 246
- Likely real
- Yes, 50% confidence
Generic Secret detected
- -cookie-secret=ZXhhbXBsZS1jb29raWUtc2VjcmV0enp6 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /operator/hack/addon_grafana_gateway_ocp_oauth.yaml line 188
- Likely real
- Yes, 50% confidence
Generic Secret detected
- -cookie-secret=ZXhhbXBsZS1jb29raWUtc2VjcmV0enp6 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /production/helm/loki/values.yaml line 399
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
bcrypt hash detected
# passwordHash: "$2y$10$7O40CaY1yz7fu9O24k2/u.ct/wELYHRBsn25v/7AyuQ8E8hrLqpva" # generated using `htpasswd -nbBC10 test-user-2 test-password-2` -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /production/helm/loki/ci/non-default-values.yaml line 13
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
bcrypt hash detected
passwordHash: "$2y$10$7O40CaY1yz7fu9O24k2/u.ct/wELYHRBsn25v/7AyuQ8E8hrLqpva" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /clients/cmd/fluent-bit/Dockerfile line 24
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 24% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
CMD ["/fluent-bit/bin/fluent-bit", "-e","/fluent-bit/bin/out_grafana_loki.so", "-c", "/fluent-bit/etc/fluent-bit.conf"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /clients/cmd/docker-driver/Dockerfile line 30
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT [ "/bin/docker-driver" ] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /cmd/logcli/Dockerfile line 16
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/bin/logcli" ] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /cmd/logql-analyzer/Dockerfile line 14
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/bin/logql-analyzer" ] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /cmd/loki-canary-boringcrypto/Dockerfile line 14
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/bin/loki-canary" ] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /cmd/loki-canary/Dockerfile line 14
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/bin/loki-canary" ] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /cmd/migrate/Dockerfile line 12
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT [ "/busybox/tail", "-f", "/dev/null" ] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /cmd/querytee/Dockerfile line 15
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/bin/querytee" ] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /production/helm/loki/src/helm-test/Dockerfile line 13
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/bin/helm-test" ] -
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/libc/capi_windows_arm64.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 18% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_anti_analysis — Checks for a debugger, VM, or sandbox before continuing - a common malware evasion technique, essentially never present in ordinary application code
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/libc/libc_windows.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 18% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_anti_analysis — Checks for a debugger, VM, or sandbox before continuing - a common malware evasion technique, essentially never present in ordinary application code
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/libc/capi_windows_386.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 18% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_anti_analysis — Checks for a debugger, VM, or sandbox before continuing - a common malware evasion technique, essentially never present in ordinary application code
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/libc/capi_windows_amd64.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 18% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_anti_analysis — Checks for a debugger, VM, or sandbox before continuing - a common malware evasion technique, essentially never present in ordinary application code
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/sahilm/fuzzy/Makefile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4/.travis.yml
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/bits-and-blooms/bitset/azure-pipelines.yml
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/prometheus/procfs/Makefile.common
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/prometheus/sigv4/Makefile.common
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/Masterminds/semver/v3/Makefile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/go-playground/universal-translator/Makefile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/go-playground/validator/v10/Makefile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/twpayne/go-geom/Makefile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.github/actions/setup-k3d/action.yaml
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/sqlite/lib/sqlite_g_0000000000000003.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/sqlite/lib/sqlite_g_000000000000003c.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/cel.dev/expr/syntax.pb.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/sqlite/lib/sqlite_g_0000000000018000.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/libc/ccgo_linux_386.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/extensions/load_balancing_policies/ring_hash/v3/ring_hash.pb.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/config/cluster/v3/cluster.pb.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/sqlite/lib/sqlite_netbsd_amd64.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/sqlite/lib/sqlite_g_0000000000060000.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/libc/ccgo_linux_s390x.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/libc/ccgo_linux_arm64.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/libc/ccgo_linux_riscv64.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/libc/ccgo_linux_loong64.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/syscall_zos_s390x.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/sqlite/lib/sqlite.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/libc/ccgo_linux_amd64.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/libc/ccgo_linux_arm.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/api/expr/v1alpha1/syntax.pb.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/libc/ccgo_linux_ppc64le.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_obfuscated_string_execution — Reconstructs a string character-by-character or from hex escapes, then immediately executes it - fromCharCode/chr() alone are common in ordinary text-processing code, so this requires both the reconstruction and an execution call together
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2/lexers/embedded/bash.xml
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_persistence_mechanism — Modifies a startup/scheduling location - legitimate application code essentially never does this
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /tools/packaging/loki-postinstall.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_persistence_mechanism — Modifies a startup/scheduling location - legitimate application code essentially never does this
-
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /clients/cmd/docker-driver/docker-compose.yaml line 3
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Service 'nginx' is running with a writable root filesystem. This may allow malicious applications to download and run additional payloads, or modify container files. If an application inside a container has to save something temporarily consider using a tmpfs. Add 'read_only: true' to this service to prevent this.
nginx: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /cmd/logql-analyzer/docker-compose.yaml line 11
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Service 'docs' is running with a writable root filesystem. This may allow malicious applications to download and run additional payloads, or modify container files. If an application inside a container has to save something temporarily consider using a tmpfs. Add 'read_only: true' to this service to prevent this.
docs: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /debug/docker-compose.yaml line 7
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Service 'loki' is running with a writable root filesystem. This may allow malicious applications to download and run additional payloads, or modify container files. If an application inside a container has to save something temporarily consider using a tmpfs. Add 'read_only: true' to this service to prevent this.
loki: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /debug/docker-compose.yaml line 19
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Service 'promtail' is running with a writable root filesystem. This may allow malicious applications to download and run additional payloads, or modify container files. If an application inside a container has to save something temporarily consider using a tmpfs. Add 'read_only: true' to this service to prevent this.
promtail: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/logcli/client/client.go line 736
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Variable `resp` is likely modified and later used on error. In some cases this could result in panics due to a nil dereference
conn, resp, err := ws.Dial(us, h) if err != nil { if resp == nil { return nil, err } buf, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) // nolint return nil, fmt.Errorf("error response from server: %s (%v)", string(buf), err) } -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/querier/queryrange/querysharding.go line 181
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Variable `version` is likely modified and later used on error. In some cases this could result in panics due to a nil dereference
version, err := logql.ParseShardVersion(v) if err != nil { level.Warn(spLogger).Log( "msg", "failed to parse shard version", "fallback", version.String(), "err", err.Error(), "user", tenants[0], "query", r.GetQuery(), ) } -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/querier/queryrange/querysharding.go line 230
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Variable `res` is likely modified and later used on error. In some cases this could result in panics due to a nil dereference
res, err := query.Exec(ctx) if err != nil { // Keep the usage of the shards and index lookups that completed before // the failure. stats.JoinPartial(ctx, res.Statistics) stats.JoinPartial(ctx, resolverStats.Result(0, 0, 0)) return nil, err } -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/ui/cluster.go line 76
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Variable `member` is likely modified and later used on error. In some cases this could result in panics due to a nil dereference
member, err := s.fetchMemberState(ctx, instanceAddr) if err != nil { member.Error = err } -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /debug/docker-compose.yaml line 32
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Service 'grafana' is running with a writable root filesystem. This may allow malicious applications to download and run additional payloads, or modify container files. If an application inside a container has to save something temporarily consider using a tmpfs. Add 'read_only: true' to this service to prevent this.
grafana: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/dataobj/uploader/uploader.go line 67
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
This code uses a 224-bit hash function, which is deprecated or disallowed in some security policies. Consider updating to a stronger hash function such as SHA-384 or higher to ensure compliance and security.
hash := sha256.New224() -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/dataobj/index/indexer.go line 511
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
This code uses a 224-bit hash function, which is deprecated or disallowed in some security policies. Consider updating to a stronger hash function such as SHA-384 or higher to ensure compliance and security.
h := sha256.New224() -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/dataobj/compaction/v2/output_naming.go line 11
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
This code uses a 224-bit hash function, which is deprecated or disallowed in some security policies. Consider updating to a stronger hash function such as SHA-384 or higher to ensure compliance and security.
h := sha256.New224() -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /clients/cmd/fluentd/lib/fluent/plugin/out_loki.rb line 226
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected SSL that will accept an unverified connection. This makes the connections susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. Use 'OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_PEER' instead.
verify_mode: OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_NONE -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /clients/cmd/logstash/lib/logstash/outputs/loki.rb line 161
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected SSL that will accept an unverified connection. This makes the connections susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. Use 'OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_PEER' instead.
verify_mode: OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_NONE -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/dataset/layout/codec_struct.go line 222
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Iteration over a possibly empty map `filterCols`. This is likely a bug or redundant code
filterCols := make(map[string]struct{}) if filter != nil { filterCols = collectColumns(filter) } // Union of projection and filter field references. needed := make(map[string]struct{}) for name := range childProj { needed[name] = struct{}{} } for name := range collectColumns(simplified) { needed[name] = struct{}{} } for name := range filterCols { needed[name] = struct{}{} } -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/engine/internal/worker/worker.go line 521
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Iteration over a possibly empty map `sources`. This is likely a bug or redundant code
sources = make(map[ulid.ULID]*streamSource) sinks = make(map[ulid.ULID]*streamSink) ) defer func() { if err == nil { return } // If we happened to run into a ULID collision while creating the job, // we want to clean up any streams we stored in the maps. for sourceID := range sources { delete(w.sources, sourceID) } for sinkID := range sinks { delete(w.sinks, sinkID) } }() -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/storage/stores/shipper/indexshipper/downloads/table_manager.go line 351
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Iteration over a possibly empty map `distinctUsers`. This is likely a bug or redundant code
distinctUsers := make(map[string]struct{}) defer func() { ids := make([]string, 0, len(distinctUsers)) for k := range distinctUsers { ids = append(ids, k) } level.Info(tm.logger).Log("msg", "query readiness setup completed", "duration", time.Since(start), "distinct_users_len", len(distinctUsers), "distinct_users", strings.Join(ids, ",")) }() -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/engine/internal/worker/worker.go line 522
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Iteration over a possibly empty map `sinks`. This is likely a bug or redundant code
sinks = make(map[ulid.ULID]*streamSink) ) defer func() { if err == nil { return } // If we happened to run into a ULID collision while creating the job, // we want to clean up any streams we stored in the maps. for sourceID := range sources { delete(w.sources, sourceID) } for sinkID := range sinks { delete(w.sinks, sinkID) } }() -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /clients/cmd/fluentd/spec/gems/fluent/plugin/loki_output_spec.rb line 381
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
The RSA key size 1024 is insufficent by NIST standards. It is recommended to use a key length of 2048 or higher.
key = OpenSSL::PKey::RSA.new(1024) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /debug/docker-compose.yaml line 19
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Service 'promtail' is explicitly disabling seccomp confinement. This runs the service in an unrestricted state. Remove 'seccomp:unconfined' to prevent this.
promtail: # this is required according to https://github.com/Microsoft/vscode-go/wiki/Debugging-Go-code-using-VS-Code#linuxdocker security_opt: - seccomp:unconfined image: grafana/promtail-debug:latest ports: - "40100:40000" volumes: - /var/log:/var/log command: -config.file=/etc/promtail/docker-config.yaml networks: - loki -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /debug/docker-compose.yaml line 7
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Service 'loki' is explicitly disabling seccomp confinement. This runs the service in an unrestricted state. Remove 'seccomp:unconfined' to prevent this.
loki: # this is required according to https://github.com/Microsoft/vscode-go/wiki/Debugging-Go-code-using-VS-Code#linuxdocker security_opt: - seccomp:unconfined image: grafana/loki-debug:latest ports: - "40000:40000" - "3100:3100" command: -config.file=/etc/loki/local-config.yaml networks: - loki -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /debug/docker-compose.yaml line 19
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Service 'promtail' allows for privilege escalation via setuid or setgid binaries. Add 'no-new-privileges:true' in 'security_opt' to prevent this.
promtail: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /clients/cmd/docker-driver/docker-compose.yaml line 3
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Service 'nginx' allows for privilege escalation via setuid or setgid binaries. Add 'no-new-privileges:true' in 'security_opt' to prevent this.
nginx: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /cmd/logql-analyzer/docker-compose.yaml line 11
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Service 'docs' allows for privilege escalation via setuid or setgid binaries. Add 'no-new-privileges:true' in 'security_opt' to prevent this.
docs: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /debug/docker-compose.yaml line 7
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Service 'loki' allows for privilege escalation via setuid or setgid binaries. Add 'no-new-privileges:true' in 'security_opt' to prevent this.
loki: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /debug/docker-compose.yaml line 32
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Service 'grafana' allows for privilege escalation via setuid or setgid binaries. Add 'no-new-privileges:true' in 'security_opt' to prevent this.
grafana: -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/compactor/compactor.go line 466
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Calling `wg.Wait()` inside a loop blocks the call to `wg.Done()`
var wg sync.WaitGroup for { select { case <-ctx.Done(): if runningCancel != nil { runningCancel() } wg.Wait() level.Info(util_log.Logger).Log("msg", "compactor exiting") return nil case <-syncTicker.C: bufDescs, bufHosts, bufZones := ring.MakeBuffersForGet() rs, err := c.ring.Get(ringKeyOfLeader, ring.Write, bufDescs, bufHosts, bufZones) if err != nil { level.Error(util_log.Logger).Log("msg", "error asking ring for who should run the compactor, will check again", "err", err) continue } addrs := rs.GetAddresses() if len(addrs) != 1 { level.Error(util_log.Logger).Log("msg", "too many addresses (more that one) return when asking the ring who should run the compactor, will check again") continue } if c.ringLifecycler.GetInstanceAddr() == addrs[0] { // If not running, start if !c.running { level.Info(util_log.Logger).Log("msg", "this instance has been chosen to run the compactor, starting compactor") runningCtx, runningCancel = context.WithCancel(ctx) wg.Add(1) go func() { defer wg.Done() c.tablesManager.start(runningCtx) }() if c.deleteRequestsManager != nil { wg.Add(1) go func() { defer wg.Done() c.deleteRequestsManager.Start(runningCtx) }() } if c.cfg.HorizontalScalingMode == HorizontalScalingModeMain { wg.Add(1) go func() { defer wg.Done() c.JobQueue.Start(runningCtx) }() } c.running = true c.metrics.compactorRunning.Set(1) } } else { // If running, shutdown if c.running { level.Info(util_log.Logger).Log("msg", "this instance should no longer run the compactor, stopping compactor") runningCancel() wg.Wait() c.running = false c.metrics.compactorRunning.Set(0) level.Info(util_log.Logger).Log("msg", "compactor stopped") } } } } -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/go-openapi/strfmt/duration.go line 40
- Likely real
- Yes, 98% confidence
Detects unicode homoglyphs and uncommon characters used for obfuscation [threat-runtime-obfuscation-unicode]
"µs": micros, // U+00B5 = micro symbol "μs": micros, // U+03BC = Greek letter mu "micro": micros, "micros": micros, -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/aliyun/credentials-go/credentials/ecs_ram_role_credentials_provider.go line 15
- Likely real
- Yes, 98% confidence
Detects URLs to suspicious domains often used for exfiltration or C2 [threat-network-exfiltration]
var securityCredURL = "http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/" var securityCredTokenURL = "http://100.100.100.200/latest/api/token" const defaultMetadataTokenDuration = int(21600) -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/aliyun/credentials-go/credentials/ecs_ram_role_credentials_provider.go line 14
- Likely real
- Yes, 98% confidence
Detects URLs to suspicious domains often used for exfiltration or C2 [threat-network-exfiltration]
var securityCredURL = "http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/" var securityCredTokenURL = "http://100.100.100.200/latest/api/token" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /cmd/logline-util/dump_report.go line 122
- Likely real
- Yes, 82% confidence
Semgrep could not determine that the argument to 'template.HTML()' is a constant. 'template.HTML()' and similar does not escape contents. Be absolutely sure there is no user-controlled data in this template. If user data can reach this template, you may have a XSS vulnerability. Instead, do not use this function and use 'template.Execute()'.
PointsJSON: template.JS(pointsBytes), -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /operator/internal/manifests/networkpolicy.go line 490
- Likely real
- Yes, 82% confidence
Downcasting or changing sign of an integer with `int32` method
if p, err := strconv.Atoi(u.Port()); err == nil && p > 0 { port = int32(p) } -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /operator/internal/handlers/internal/networkpolicy/service.go line 231
- Likely real
- Yes, 82% confidence
Downcasting or changing sign of an integer with `int32` method
if port, err := strconv.Atoi(u.Port()); err == nil { return int32(port) } -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /operator/internal/handlers/internal/networkpolicy/service.go line 243
- Likely real
- Yes, 81% confidence
Downcasting or changing sign of an integer with `int32` method
if port, err := strconv.Atoi(portStr); err == nil { return int32(port) } -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/ui/handler.go line 98
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
An HTTP redirect was found to be crafted from user-input `r`. This can lead to open redirect vulnerabilities, potentially allowing attackers to redirect users to malicious web sites. It is recommend where possible to not allow user-input to craft the redirect URL. When user-input is necessary to craft the request, it is recommended to follow OWASP best practices to restrict the URL to domains in an allowlist.
http.Redirect(w, r, "/ui/404?path="+r.URL.Path, http.StatusTemporaryRedirect) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/util/server/error.go line 167
- Likely real
- Yes, 56% confidence
Detected 'Fprintf' or similar writing to 'http.ResponseWriter'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package to render data to users.
fmt.Fprint(w, cerr.Error()) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/loki/status.go line 15
- Likely real
- Yes, 56% confidence
Detected 'Fprintf' or similar writing to 'http.ResponseWriter'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package to render data to users.
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%v => %v\n", mod, s.State()) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/storage/chunk/chunk.go line 192
- Likely real
- Yes, 54% confidence
Downcasting or changing sign of an integer with `uint32` method
checksum, err := strconv.ParseUint(unsafeGetString(partsBytes), 16, 64) if err != nil { return Chunk{}, errors.Wrap(err, "parsing checksum") } return Chunk{ ChunkRef: logproto.ChunkRef{ UserID: userID, Fingerprint: fingerprint, From: model.Time(from), Through: model.Time(through), Checksum: uint32(checksum), }, }, nil -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/ui/handler.go line 226
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
ReverseProxy can remove headers added by Director. Consider using ReverseProxy.Rewrite instead of ReverseProxy.Director.
Director: func(r *http.Request) { // Extract tenantID from URL path vars := mux.Vars(r) tenantID := vars["tenantID"] // Validate tenant ID using existing validation if err := tenant.ValidTenantID(tenantID); err != nil { level.Error(s.logger).Log("msg", "invalid tenant ID", "tenant", tenantID, "err", err) // Return error - will be caught by ErrorHandler return } // Proxy to series endpoint on same host r.URL.Scheme = proxyScheme r.URL.Host = s.localAddr r.URL.Path = "/loki/api/v1/series" r.RequestURI = "" // Must be cleared according to Go docs // Override tenant header with the one from URL r.Header.Set("X-Scope-OrgID", tenantID) // Query params (match[], start, end, etc.) are preserved automatically in r.URL.RawQuery level.Debug(s.logger).Log( "msg", "proxying analyze-labels to series endpoint", "tenant", tenantID, "target", r.URL.String(), ) }, -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/ui/handler.go line 106
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
ReverseProxy can remove headers added by Director. Consider using ReverseProxy.Rewrite instead of ReverseProxy.Director.
Director: func(r *http.Request) { r.URL.Scheme = proxyScheme vars := mux.Vars(r) nodeName := vars["nodename"] if nodeName == "" { level.Error(s.logger).Log("msg", "node name not found in URL") s.redirectToNotFound(r, nodeName) return } // Find node address by name nodeAddr, err := s.findNodeAddressByName(nodeName) if err != nil { level.Warn(s.logger).Log("msg", "node not found in cluster", "node", nodeName, "err", err) s.redirectToNotFound(r, nodeName) return } // Calculate the path without the proxy prefix trimPrefix := fmt.Sprintf("/ui/api/v1/proxy/%s", nodeName) newPath := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, trimPrefix) if newPath == "" { newPath = "/" } // Rewrite the URL to forward to the target node r.URL.Host = nodeAddr r.URL.Path = newPath r.RequestURI = "" // Must be cleared according to Go docs level.Debug(s.logger).Log( "msg", "proxying request", "node", nodeName, "target", r.URL.String(), "original_path", r.URL.Path, ) }, -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/storage/stores/shipper/bloomshipper/resolver.go line 121
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
Downcasting or changing sign of an integer with `uint32` method
checksum, err := strconv.ParseUint(fnParts[2], 16, 64) if err != nil { return BlockRef{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse checksum of meta key %s : %w", loc, err) } dirParts := strings.Split(path.Clean(dir), "/") if len(dirParts) < 5 { return BlockRef{}, fmt.Errorf("directory parts count must be 5 or greater, but was %d : [%s]", len(dirParts), loc) } bounds, err := v1.ParseBoundsFromAddr(dirParts[len(dirParts)-1]) if err != nil { return BlockRef{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse bounds of block key %s : %w", loc, err) } return BlockRef{ Ref: Ref{ TenantID: dirParts[len(dirParts)-3], TableName: dirParts[len(dirParts)-4], Bounds: bounds, StartTimestamp: interval.Start, EndTimestamp: interval.End, Checksum: uint32(checksum), }, Codec: enc, }, nil -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/storage/stores/shipper/bloomshipper/resolver.go line 63
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
Downcasting or changing sign of an integer with `uint32` method
checksum, err := strconv.ParseUint(withoutExt, 16, 64) if err != nil { return MetaRef{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse checksum of meta key %s : %w", loc, err) } dirParts := strings.Split(path.Clean(dir), "/") if len(dirParts) < 4 { return MetaRef{}, fmt.Errorf("directory parts count must be 4 or greater, but was %d : [%s]", len(dirParts), loc) } return MetaRef{ Ref: Ref{ TenantID: dirParts[len(dirParts)-2], TableName: dirParts[len(dirParts)-3], Bounds: bounds, Checksum: uint32(checksum), }, }, nil -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /operator/internal/manifests/gateway.go line 550
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
Detected SHA1 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. SHA1 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use SHA256 or SHA3 instead.
s := sha1.New() -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /operator/internal/handlers/internal/storage/ca_configmap.go line 53
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
Detected SHA1 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. SHA1 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use SHA256 or SHA3 instead.
h := sha1.New() -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /operator/internal/handlers/internal/storage/secrets.go line 230
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
Detected SHA1 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. SHA1 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use SHA256 or SHA3 instead.
h := sha1.New() -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /operator/internal/manifests/config.go line 30
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
Detected SHA1 hash algorithm which is considered insecure. SHA1 is not collision resistant and is therefore not suitable as a cryptographic signature. Use SHA256 or SHA3 instead.
s := sha1.New() -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /operator/hack/addons_ocp.yaml line 99
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
Container or pod is running in privileged mode. This grants the container the equivalent of root capabilities on the host machine. This can lead to container escapes, privilege escalation, and other security concerns. Remove the 'privileged' key to disable this capability.
privileged: true -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /operator/hack/addons_dev.yaml line 102
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
Container or pod is running in privileged mode. This grants the container the equivalent of root capabilities on the host machine. This can lead to container escapes, privilege escalation, and other security concerns. Remove the 'privileged' key to disable this capability.
privileged: true -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/goldfish/storage_mysql.go line 534
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data.
perfDifferenceQuery := ` SELECT COALESCE(EXP(AVG(LN(cell_b_exec_time_ms / cell_a_exec_time_ms))) - 1, 0) as value FROM sampled_queries ` + whereClause + ` AND cell_a_response_hash = cell_b_response_hash AND cell_b_used_new_engine = 1 AND cell_a_exec_time_ms > 0 AND cell_b_exec_time_ms > 0 AND (cell_a_bytes_processed > 0 OR cell_a_entries_returned = 0) AND (cell_b_bytes_processed > 0 OR cell_b_entries_returned = 0) ` -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/goldfish/storage_mysql.go line 516
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data.
matchingQueriesQuery := ` SELECT COALESCE(AVG(cell_a_response_hash = cell_b_response_hash), 0) as value FROM sampled_queries ` + whereClause + ` AND cell_a_status_code = 200 AND cell_b_status_code = 200 AND cell_b_used_new_engine = 1 ` -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/goldfish/storage_mysql.go line 500
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data.
engineCoverageQuery := ` SELECT CASE WHEN COUNT(sampled_at) = 0 THEN 0 ELSE SUM(cell_b_used_new_engine) / COUNT(sampled_at) END as value FROM sampled_queries ` + whereClause -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/goldfish/storage_mysql.go line 487
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
String-formatted SQL query detected. This could lead to SQL injection if the string is not sanitized properly. Audit this call to ensure the SQL is not manipulable by external data.
queriesExecutedQuery := ` SELECT COUNT(sampled_at) as value FROM sampled_queries ` + whereClause + ` AND cell_b_used_new_engine = 1 ` -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/storage/chunk/client/gcp/gcs_object_client.go line 365
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
`MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. General purpose web applications should default to TLS 1.3 with all other protocols disabled. Only where it is known that a web server must support legacy clients with unsupported an insecure browsers (such as Internet Explorer 10), it may be necessary to enable TLS 1.0 to provide support. Add `MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13' to the TLS configuration to bump the minimum version to TLS 1.3.
customTransport.TLSClientConfig = &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true} //#nosec G402 -- User has explicitly requested to disable TLS -- nosemgrep: tls-with-insecure-cipher -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/storage/chunk/client/aws/s3_storage_client.go line 222
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
`MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. General purpose web applications should default to TLS 1.3 with all other protocols disabled. Only where it is known that a web server must support legacy clients with unsupported an insecure browsers (such as Internet Explorer 10), it may be necessary to enable TLS 1.0 to provide support. Add `MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13' to the TLS configuration to bump the minimum version to TLS 1.3.
tlsConfig := &tls.Config{ InsecureSkipVerify: cfg.HTTPConfig.InsecureSkipVerify, //#nosec G402 -- User has explicitly requested to disable TLS -- nosemgrep: tls-with-insecure-cipher } -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/storage/chunk/cache/redis_client.go line 77
- Likely real
- Yes, 53% confidence
`MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. General purpose web applications should default to TLS 1.3 with all other protocols disabled. Only where it is known that a web server must support legacy clients with unsupported an insecure browsers (such as Internet Explorer 10), it may be necessary to enable TLS 1.0 to provide support. Add `MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13' to the TLS configuration to bump the minimum version to TLS 1.3.
opt.TLSConfig = &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: cfg.InsecureSkipVerify} //#nosec G402 -- User has explicitly requested to disable TLS -- nosemgrep: tls-with-insecure-cipher -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/analytics/reporter.go line 429
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
`MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. General purpose web applications should default to TLS 1.3 with all other protocols disabled. Only where it is known that a web server must support legacy clients with unsupported an insecure browsers (such as Internet Explorer 10), it may be necessary to enable TLS 1.0 to provide support. Add `MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13' to the TLS configuration to bump the minimum version to TLS 1.3.
defaultConfig := &tls.Config{} -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/storage/chunk/client/openstack/swift_object_client.go line 41
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
`MinVersion` is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, as of Go 1.22, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum. General purpose web applications should default to TLS 1.3 with all other protocols disabled. Only where it is known that a web server must support legacy clients with unsupported an insecure browsers (such as Internet Explorer 10), it may be necessary to enable TLS 1.0 to provide support. Add `MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13' to the TLS configuration to bump the minimum version to TLS 1.3.
tlsConfig := &tls.Config{} -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 850
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 357
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 764
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 758
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 751
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 683
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 677
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 670
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 600
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 594
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 587
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 517
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 511
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 504
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 440
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 434
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 427
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 32
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 587
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 307
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 301
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 267
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 222
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 147
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 45
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/release.yml line 38
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 857
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 1029
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 1023
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 1016
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 946
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 940
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 933
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 863
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 434
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 440
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/images.yml line 38
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
"uses": "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 351
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/images.yml line 44
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
"uses": "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/images.yml line 171
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
"uses": "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/images.yml line 178
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
"uses": "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/images.yml line 184
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
"uses": "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/images.yml line 311
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
"uses": "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/images.yml line 318
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
"uses": "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/images.yml line 324
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
"uses": "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/images.yml line 451
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
"uses": "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/images.yml line 458
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
"uses": "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/images.yml line 464
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
"uses": "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/images.yml line 591
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
"uses": "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/images.yml line 598
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
"uses": "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 344
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 427
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 357
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 351
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 344
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 280
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 274
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 267
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 203
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 197
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 190
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 113
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 60
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 53
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 47
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/images.yml line 604
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
"uses": "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 47
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 764
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 850
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 857
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 863
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 933
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 940
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 946
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 1016
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 1023
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 1029
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 511
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 53
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 60
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 113
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 190
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 197
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 203
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 267
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 274
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/patch-release-pr.yml line 280
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 751
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 683
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 677
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 670
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 600
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 594
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/images.yml line 31
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
"uses": "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 517
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/setup-node@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 504
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/minor-release-pr.yml line 758
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: "actions/checkout@v4" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /clients/cmd/docker-driver/main.go line 43
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
The profiling 'pprof' endpoint is automatically exposed on /debug/pprof. This could leak information about the server. Instead, use `import "net/http/pprof"`. See https://www.farsightsecurity.com/blog/txt-record/go-remote-profiling-20161028/ for more information and mitigation.
err := http.ListenAndServe(fmt.Sprintf(":%s", pprofPort), nil) //#nosec G114 -- This is a debug feature that must be intentionally enabled and is not used in prod, DOS is not a concern. -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/logql/log/fmt.go line 10
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
When working with web applications that involve rendering user-generated content, it's important to properly escape any HTML content to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. In Go, the `text/template` package does not automatically escape HTML content, which can leave your application vulnerable to these types of attacks. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to use the `html/template` package instead, which provides built-in functionality for HTML escaping. By using `html/template` to render your HTML content, you can help to ensure that your web application is more secure and less susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities.
"text/template" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /clients/pkg/logentry/stages/replace.go line 8
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
When working with web applications that involve rendering user-generated content, it's important to properly escape any HTML content to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. In Go, the `text/template` package does not automatically escape HTML content, which can leave your application vulnerable to these types of attacks. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to use the `html/template` package instead, which provides built-in functionality for HTML escaping. By using `html/template` to render your HTML content, you can help to ensure that your web application is more secure and less susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities.
"text/template" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /clients/pkg/logentry/stages/template.go line 11
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
When working with web applications that involve rendering user-generated content, it's important to properly escape any HTML content to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. In Go, the `text/template` package does not automatically escape HTML content, which can leave your application vulnerable to these types of attacks. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to use the `html/template` package instead, which provides built-in functionality for HTML escaping. By using `html/template` to render your HTML content, you can help to ensure that your web application is more secure and less susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities.
"text/template" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /integration/cluster/cluster.go line 16
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
When working with web applications that involve rendering user-generated content, it's important to properly escape any HTML content to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. In Go, the `text/template` package does not automatically escape HTML content, which can leave your application vulnerable to these types of attacks. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to use the `html/template` package instead, which provides built-in functionality for HTML escaping. By using `html/template` to render your HTML content, you can help to ensure that your web application is more secure and less susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities.
"text/template" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /operator/internal/manifests/internal/alerts/build.go line 7
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
When working with web applications that involve rendering user-generated content, it's important to properly escape any HTML content to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. In Go, the `text/template` package does not automatically escape HTML content, which can leave your application vulnerable to these types of attacks. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to use the `html/template` package instead, which provides built-in functionality for HTML escaping. By using `html/template` to render your HTML content, you can help to ensure that your web application is more secure and less susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities.
"text/template" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /operator/internal/manifests/internal/config/build.go line 7
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
When working with web applications that involve rendering user-generated content, it's important to properly escape any HTML content to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. In Go, the `text/template` package does not automatically escape HTML content, which can leave your application vulnerable to these types of attacks. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to use the `html/template` package instead, which provides built-in functionality for HTML escaping. By using `html/template` to render your HTML content, you can help to ensure that your web application is more secure and less susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities.
"text/template" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /operator/internal/manifests/internal/gateway/build.go line 7
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
When working with web applications that involve rendering user-generated content, it's important to properly escape any HTML content to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. In Go, the `text/template` package does not automatically escape HTML content, which can leave your application vulnerable to these types of attacks. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to use the `html/template` package instead, which provides built-in functionality for HTML escaping. By using `html/template` to render your HTML content, you can help to ensure that your web application is more secure and less susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities.
"text/template" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/engine/internal/executor/parse_linefmt.go line 6
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
When working with web applications that involve rendering user-generated content, it's important to properly escape any HTML content to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. In Go, the `text/template` package does not automatically escape HTML content, which can leave your application vulnerable to these types of attacks. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to use the `html/template` package instead, which provides built-in functionality for HTML escaping. By using `html/template` to render your HTML content, you can help to ensure that your web application is more secure and less susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities.
"text/template" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /tools/doc-generator/main.go line 15
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
When working with web applications that involve rendering user-generated content, it's important to properly escape any HTML content to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. In Go, the `text/template` package does not automatically escape HTML content, which can leave your application vulnerable to these types of attacks. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to use the `html/template` package instead, which provides built-in functionality for HTML escaping. By using `html/template` to render your HTML content, you can help to ensure that your web application is more secure and less susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities.
"text/template" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /clients/cmd/fluent-bit/loki.go line 226
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 50% confidence
Deserializing into `interface{}` allows arbitrary data structures and types, which can lead to security vulnerabilities (CWE-502). Use a concrete struct type instead.
var data interface{} err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(s), &data) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/scripts/common.sh line 56
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
The special variable IFS affects how splitting takes place when expanding unquoted variables. Don't set it globally. Prefer a dedicated utility such as 'cut' or 'awk' if you need to split input data. If you must use 'read', set IFS locally using e.g. 'IFS="," read -a my_array'.
echo $(local IFS=$delimiter ; echo "${array[*]}") -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/scripts/common.sh line 46
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
The special variable IFS affects how splitting takes place when expanding unquoted variables. Don't set it globally. Prefer a dedicated utility such as 'cut' or 'awk' if you need to split input data. If you must use 'read', set IFS locally using e.g. 'IFS="," read -a my_array'.
echo $(local IFS=$delimiter ; echo "${array[*]}") -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/storage/chunk/client/gcp/gcs_object_client.go line 365
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Checks for disabling of TLS/SSL certificate verification. This should only be used for debugging purposes because it leads to vulnerability to MTM attacks.
customTransport.TLSClientConfig = &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true} //#nosec G402 -- User has explicitly requested to disable TLS -- nosemgrep: tls-with-insecure-cipher -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /clients/cmd/docker-driver/main.go line 43
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 48% confidence
Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information.
err := http.ListenAndServe(fmt.Sprintf(":%s", pprofPort), nil) //#nosec G114 -- This is a debug feature that must be intentionally enabled and is not used in prod, DOS is not a concern. -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /cmd/migrate/main.go line 56
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 48% confidence
Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information.
log.Println(http.ListenAndServe("localhost:8080", nil)) //#nosec G114 -- This is only bound to localhost, not a plausible DOS vector. -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/storage/bloom/v1/archive.go line 129
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 48% confidence
Detected a possible denial-of-service via a zip bomb attack. By limiting the max bytes read, you can mitigate this attack. `io.CopyN()` can specify a size.
written, err := io.Copy(f, limited) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/storage/stores/shipper/indexshipper/testutil/testutil.go line 153
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 48% confidence
Detected a possible denial-of-service via a zip bomb attack. By limiting the max bytes read, you can mitigate this attack. `io.CopyN()` can specify a size.
_, err = io.Copy(decompressedFile, compressedReader) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/logqlanalyzer/http.go line 57
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'.
if n, err := w.Write(responseBody); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/ingester/ingester.go line 984
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'.
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(err.Error())) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/labelaccess/error.go line 27
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'.
w.Write(errorAPIBytes) // nolint:errcheck -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/loghttp/push/push.go line 662
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'.
_, _ = w.Write(writeResponseFailedBody) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/loghttp/push/push.go line 667
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'.
if _, err = w.Write(respBytes); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/loghttp/push/push.go line 673
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'.
_, _ = w.Write(writeResponseFailedBody) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /pkg/loki/config_handler.go line 283
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'.
_, _ = w.Write(data) -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/cloud.google.com/go/auth/internal/regionalaccessboundary/regional_access_boundary.go line 85
- Likely real
- Yes, 93% confidence
Detects reading of environment variables (credential access, often contains secrets) [threat-runtime-environment-read]
func isRegionalAccessBoundaryEnabled() (bool, error) { val := strings.ToLower(os.Getenv("GOOGLE_AUTH_TRUST_BOUNDARY_ENABLED")) return val == "true" || val == "1", nil } -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /operator/internal/sizes/predict.go line 111
- Likely real
- Yes, 93% confidence
Detects reading of environment variables (credential access, often contains secrets) [threat-runtime-environment-read]
promURL = os.Getenv("PROMETHEUS_URL") promToken = os.Getenv("PROMETHEUS_TOKEN") // Create a client to collect metrics -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/cloud.google.com/go/storage/grpc_client.go line 114
- Likely real
- Yes, 93% confidence
Detects reading of environment variables (credential access, often contains secrets) [threat-runtime-environment-read]
internaloption.EnableDirectPathXds()) if disableBoundToken, _ := strconv.ParseBool(os.Getenv("STORAGE_DISABLE_DIRECTPATH_BOUND_TOKEN")); !disableBoundToken { defaults = append(defaults, internaloption.AllowHardBoundTokens("ALTS")) } -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /vendor/github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2/table.py line 4
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 14% confidence
Consider possible security implications associated with the subprocess module.
3 from collections import defaultdict 4 from subprocess import check_output 5 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /vendor/github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2/table.py line 8
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 12% confidence
Starting a process with a partial executable path
7 8 lines = check_output(["chroma", "--list"]).decode("utf-8").splitlines() 9 lines = [line.strip() for line in lines if line.startswith(" ") and not line.startswith(" ")] -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /vendor/github.com/alecthomas/chroma/v2/table.py line 8
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 3% confidence
subprocess call - check for execution of untrusted input.
7 8 lines = check_output(["chroma", "--list"]).decode("utf-8").splitlines() 9 lines = [line.strip() for line in lines if line.startswith(" ") and not line.startswith(" ")] -
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_netbsd_amd64.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /CHANGELOG.md
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /pkg/lokifrontend/frontend/v2/frontend.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /tools/release-note.md
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/yuin/gopher-lua/_state.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/yuin/gopher-lua/state.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/github.com/bits-and-blooms/bloom/v3/Makefile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_netbsd_386.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_openbsd_ppc64.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_openbsd_arm64.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_openbsd_386.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_openbsd_arm.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_openbsd_riscv64.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_openbsd_amd64.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_netbsd_arm64.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_netbsd_arm.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/golang.org/x/sys/unix/ztypes_openbsd_mips64.go
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /vendor/modernc.org/libc/Makefile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
No findings match these filters.