Scan report
ava-labs / avalanchego
Could an attacker exploit mistakes in this code?
Strong warning signs. Do not run or install this without a careful review.
- High
- 33
- Medium
- 107
- Low
- 0
Sources: Bandit, Semgrep, pip-audit
Does this code look like it is trying to cause harm?
Minor issues. Worth a glance, unlikely to be urgent.
- High
- 4
- Medium
- 1
- Low
- 1
Sources: YARA, ClamAV, GuardDog, dependency checker
- Likely real
- 116
- Uncertain
- 24
- Likely noise
- 6
The risk classifier rates every finding for how likely it is to be a real issue. Likely noise still counts, just much less.
What we found, in plain English
This repository has two distinct security issues that require immediate attention before it can be used safely. The most critical problem is an insecure gRPC connection found in the code, which means sensitive data could potentially be tampered with by attackers without encryption. Additionally, there are several high-risk patterns in the GitHub Actions workflows, including the use of pull_request_target to access external repositories and hardcoded private keys that should never be stored directly in source files. While some findings appear to be malicious intent or suspicious links, the majority represent standard insecure coding practices like using unencrypted web sockets and running commands without proper input validation. The scan also identified a Dockerfile configuration that allows containers to run as root users, which is a significant risk if an attacker controls the container process. Overall, the repository presents a critical vulnerability score of 380.0 due to these severe security flaws, so it should not be deployed until these issues are fixed by the development team.
Written by a local language model from the findings below. The risk scores come from the classifier, not from this summary.
Detections by engine
Score over time
Overall score each time this repository was scanned.
Findings
Highest severity first. Select a finding to see the code and what it means.
-
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /utils/crypto/bls/signer/rpcsigner/client.go line 40
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Found an insecure gRPC connection using 'insecure.NewCredentials()'. This creates a connection without encryption to a gRPC server. A malicious attacker could tamper with the gRPC message, which could compromise the machine. Instead, establish a secure connection with an SSL certificate using the 'grpc.WithTransportCredentials()' function. You can create a create credentials using a 'tls.Config{}' struct with 'credentials.NewTLS()'. The final fix looks like this: 'grpc.WithTransportCredentials(credentials.NewTLS(<config>))'.
conn, err := grpc.NewClient(url, opts, grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials())) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /vms/rpcchainvm/grpcutils/client.go line 54
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Found an insecure gRPC connection using 'insecure.NewCredentials()'. This creates a connection without encryption to a gRPC server. A malicious attacker could tamper with the gRPC message, which could compromise the machine. Instead, establish a secure connection with an SSL certificate using the 'grpc.WithTransportCredentials()' function. You can create a create credentials using a 'tls.Config{}' struct with 'credentials.NewTLS()'. The final fix looks like this: 'grpc.WithTransportCredentials(credentials.NewTLS(<config>))'.
grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()), -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/claude-review.yml line 33
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
This GitHub Actions workflow file uses `pull_request_target` and checks out code from the incoming pull request. When using `pull_request_target`, the Action runs in the context of the target repository, which includes access to all repository secrets. Normally, this is safe because the Action only runs code from the target repository, not the incoming PR. However, by checking out the incoming PR code, you're now using the incoming code for the rest of the action. You may be inadvertently executing arbitrary code from the incoming PR with access to repository secrets, which would let an attacker steal repository secrets. This normally happens by running build scripts (e.g., `npm build` and `make`) or dependency installation scripts (e.g., `python setup.py install`). Audit your workflow file to make sure no code from the incoming PR is executed. Please see https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ for additional mitigations.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 with: # Needed to fetch the PR head commit since we are using pull_request_target ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} fetch-depth: 1 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/bazel-ci-pre-merge.yml line 33
- Likely real
- Yes, 87% confidence
This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
secrets: inherit -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/bazel-ci-pre-merge.yml line 41
- Likely real
- Yes, 87% confidence
This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
secrets: inherit -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/bazel-ci-scheduled.yml line 50
- Likely real
- Yes, 87% confidence
This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
secrets: inherit -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 509
- Likely real
- Yes, 87% confidence
This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
secrets: inherit -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 517
- Likely real
- Yes, 87% confidence
This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
secrets: inherit -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-scheduled.yml line 40
- Likely real
- Yes, 87% confidence
This workflow uses `secrets: inherit` to pass all of the calling workflow's secrets to a reusable workflow. This violates the principle of least privilege because the called workflow receives access to every secret in the repository, not just the ones it needs. If the called workflow is compromised or sourced from a third party, an attacker gains access to all repository secrets. Instead, explicitly pass only the secrets that the called workflow requires using the `secrets:` map, e.g. `secrets: { MY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.MY_SECRET }} }`.
secrets: inherit -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/c-chain-reexecution-benchmark/action.yml line 131
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: ./scripts/run_task.sh test-cchain-reexecution -- "${{ inputs.test || '' }}" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/self-hosted-load-tests.yaml line 43
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: >- ./scripts/run_task.sh test-load-kube -- ${{ inputs.avalanchego_image && format('--kube-image {0}', inputs.avalanchego_image) || '' }} ${{ inputs.exclusive_scheduling == 'true' && '--kube-use-exclusive-scheduling' || '' }} ${{ inputs.duration && format('--load-timeout {0}', inputs.duration) || '' }} -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci.yml line 30
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: ./scripts/run_task.sh ${{ inputs.run_race_shuffle_unit_tests && 'test-unit-race-shuffle' || 'test-unit' }} -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/firewood-chaos-test.yml line 51
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | if [[ "${{ github.event_name }}" == "workflow_dispatch" ]]; then { echo "matrix<<EOF" printf '{ "include": [{ "test": "%s", "start-block": "%s", "end-block": "%s", "block-dir-src": "%s", "current-state-dir-src": "%s", "config": "%s", "min-wait-time": "%s", "max-wait-time": "%s", "runner": "%s", "timeout-minutes": %s }] }\n' \ "${{ github.event.inputs.test }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.start-block }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.end-block }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.block-dir-src }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.current-state-dir-src }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.config }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.min-wait-time }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.max-wait-time }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.runner }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.timeout-minutes }}" echo EOF } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" else { echo "matrix<<EOF" echo '{ "include": [{ "test": "firewood-101-250k" }, { "test": "firewood-archive-101-250k" }] }' echo EOF } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" fi -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/c-chain-reexecution-benchmark-gh-native.yml line 57
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | if [[ "${{ github.event_name }}" == "workflow_dispatch" ]]; then # Parse 'with-dependencies' input for dependency refs FIREWOOD_REF="" LIBEVM_REF="" [[ "${{ github.event.inputs.with-dependencies }}" =~ firewood=([^,]+) ]] && FIREWOOD_REF="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}" [[ "${{ github.event.inputs.with-dependencies }}" =~ libevm=([^,]+) ]] && LIBEVM_REF="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}" { echo "matrix<<EOF" printf '{ "include": [{ "test": "%s", "start-block": "%s", "end-block": "%s", "block-dir-src": "%s", "current-state-dir-src": "%s", "config": "%s", "runner": "%s", "timeout-minutes": %s, "firewood-ref": "%s", "libevm-ref": "%s" }] }\n' \ "${{ github.event.inputs.test }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.start-block }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.end-block }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.block-dir-src }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.current-state-dir-src }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.config }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.runner }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.timeout-minutes }}" \ "$FIREWOOD_REF" \ "$LIBEVM_REF" echo EOF } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" else json_string=$(jq -r ".\"${{ github.event_name }}\"" .github/workflows/c-chain-reexecution-benchmark-gh-native.json) { echo "matrix<<EOF" echo "$json_string" echo EOF } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" fi -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/c-chain-reexecution-benchmark-container.yml line 57
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | if [[ "${{ github.event_name }}" == "workflow_dispatch" ]]; then FIREWOOD_REF="" LIBEVM_REF="" [[ "${{ github.event.inputs.with-dependencies }}" =~ firewood=([^,]+) ]] && FIREWOOD_REF="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}" [[ "${{ github.event.inputs.with-dependencies }}" =~ libevm=([^,]+) ]] && LIBEVM_REF="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}" { echo "matrix<<EOF" printf '{ "include": [{ "test": "%s", "start-block": "%s", "end-block": "%s", "block-dir-src": "%s", "current-state-dir-src": "%s", "config": "%s", "runner": "%s", "timeout-minutes": %s, "firewood-ref": "%s", "libevm-ref": "%s" }] }\n' \ "${{ github.event.inputs.test }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.start-block }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.end-block }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.block-dir-src }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.current-state-dir-src }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.config }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.runner }}" \ "${{ github.event.inputs.timeout-minutes }}" \ "$FIREWOOD_REF" \ "$LIBEVM_REF" echo EOF } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" else json_string=$(jq -r ".\"${{ github.event_name }}\"" .github/workflows/c-chain-reexecution-benchmark-container.json) { echo "matrix<<EOF" echo "$json_string" echo EOF } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" fi -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/bazel-ci.yml line 111
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: ./scripts/run_task.sh ${{ inputs.run_race_shuffle_unit_tests && 'bazel-test-unit-race-shuffle' || 'bazel-test-unit' }} -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/packaging/actions/build-package/action.yml line 59
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: ./scripts/run_task.sh --taskfile .github/packaging/Taskfile.yml test-build-${{ inputs.format }}s -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build-linux-binaries.yml line 54
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | echo "TAG=${{ github.event.inputs.tag }}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build-macos-release.yml line 54
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | echo "TAG=${{ github.event.inputs.tag }}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build-linux-binaries.yml line 124
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: | echo "TAG=${{ github.event.inputs.tag }}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/run-monitored-tmpnet-cmd/action.yml line 89
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: nix develop --impure --command bash -x ${{ inputs.run }} -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/ensure-disk-space/action.yml line 60
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: ./scripts/check_ci_disk_space.sh --min-gb "${{ inputs.min-gb }}" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/ensure-disk-space/action.yml line 30
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: ./scripts/check_ci_disk_space.sh --min-gb "${{ inputs.min-gb }}" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/collect-kind-diagnostics/action.yml line 17
- Likely real
- Yes, 57% confidence
Using variable interpolation `${{...}}` with `github` context data in a `run:` step could allow an attacker to inject their own code into the runner. This would allow them to steal secrets and code. `github` context data can have arbitrary user input and should be treated as untrusted. Instead, use an intermediate environment variable with `env:` to store the data and use the environment variable in the `run:` script. Be sure to use double-quotes the environment variable, like this: "$ENVVAR".
run: ./scripts/collect_kind_diagnostics.sh "${{ inputs.diagnostics_dir }}" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /graft/coreth/plugin/evm/service.md line 44
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
Insecure WebSocket Detected. WebSocket Secure (wss) should be used for all WebSocket connections.
> **Tip:** On localhost, use `ws://`. When using the [Public API](https://build.avax.network/integrations#RPC%20Providers) or another host that supports encryption, use `wss://`. -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /vms/rpcchainvm/runtime/subprocess/linux_stopper.go line 24
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected non-static command inside Command. Audit the input to 'exec.Command'. If unverified user data can reach this call site, this is a code injection vulnerability. A malicious actor can inject a malicious script to execute arbitrary code.
cmd := exec.Command(path, args...) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /vms/rpcchainvm/runtime/subprocess/non_linux_stopper.go line 18
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected non-static command inside Command. Audit the input to 'exec.Command'. If unverified user data can reach this call site, this is a code injection vulnerability. A malicious actor can inject a malicious script to execute arbitrary code.
return exec.Command(path, args...) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /staking/local/staker1.key line 1
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 45% confidence
Private Key detected. This is a sensitive credential and should not be hardcoded here. Instead, store this in a separate, private file.
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIJKAIBAAKCAgEAymEkcP1tGKWB/zE0IYha0dJvPZesk7sy6Q7Y7na/+UZ4SD77 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /staking/local/staker2.key line 1
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 45% confidence
Private Key detected. This is a sensitive credential and should not be hardcoded here. Instead, store this in a separate, private file.
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIJKgIBAAKCAgEA3U6EetJ2ujbkfYkgFDMsz1yTTFlUGy8k+f4mQoidwQeGFjAY -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /staking/local/staker3.key line 1
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 45% confidence
Private Key detected. This is a sensitive credential and should not be hardcoded here. Instead, store this in a separate, private file.
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIJJwIBAAKCAgEAvJlQ06B25FBdoEXVX6cnWSzSnkN/Heh2RZFDN1NXVi2RUmTb -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /staking/local/staker4.key line 1
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 45% confidence
Private Key detected. This is a sensitive credential and should not be hardcoded here. Instead, store this in a separate, private file.
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIJKQIBAAKCAgEA2Zw6AxxNp4/NsQ4x9E2+zlzKkAx8/s2y4nbejEiNVwd7zgCB -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /staking/local/staker5.key line 1
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 45% confidence
Private Key detected. This is a sensitive credential and should not be hardcoded here. Instead, store this in a separate, private file.
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIJKQIBAAKCAgEA4Cua+b3R7SRRIMO4RhP5cymh3L8M699mq5qtJPbWHISV3095 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /Dockerfile line 76
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
CMD [ "./avalanchego" ] -
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.github/packaging/Dockerfile.rpm
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.github/packaging/Dockerfile.deb
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/install_nix.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.envrc
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_persistence_mechanism — Modifies a startup/scheduling location - legitimate application code essentially never does this
-
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/dependabot.yml line 23
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
- package-ecosystem: "gomod" directory: "/graft/evm" schedule: interval: "daily" open-pull-requests-limit: 0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/dependabot.yml line 28
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
- package-ecosystem: github-actions directory: "/" schedule: interval: weekly open-pull-requests-limit: 0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/dependabot.yml line 18
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
- package-ecosystem: "gomod" directory: "/graft/subnet-evm" schedule: interval: "daily" open-pull-requests-limit: 0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/dependabot.yml line 13
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
- package-ecosystem: "gomod" directory: "/graft/coreth" schedule: interval: "daily" open-pull-requests-limit: 0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/dependabot.yml line 8
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
This Dependabot configuration does not set a cooldown period. Newly published packages can be malicious or unstable. Add a `cooldown` block with `default-days: 7` to each `package-ecosystem` entry under `updates` to wait 7 days before proposing updates to newly published package versions. Reference: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/dependabot/dependabot-version-updates/configuration-options-for-the-dependabot.yml-file#cooldown
- package-ecosystem: "gomod" # See documentation for possible values directory: "/" # Location of package manifests schedule: interval: "daily" open-pull-requests-limit: 0 # Disable non-security version updates -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /utils/dynamicip/resolver.go line 16
- Likely real
- Yes, 97% confidence
Detects URLs to URL shorteners, file sharing, and suspicious services [threat-network-outbound-shady-links]
ifConfigCoURL = "http://ifconfig.co" ifConfigMeURL = "http://ifconfig.me" // Note: All of the names below must be lowercase // because we lowercase the user's input in NewResolver. -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/bazel-ci.yml line 48
- Likely real
- Yes, 97% confidence
A secret is exposed in the workflow-level `env:` block, making it available to every job and step in this workflow — including any untrusted code run in pull-request workflows. Scope secrets as narrowly as possible: prefer step-level `env:` so the secret is only available where it is actually needed.
BAZEL_REMOTE_CACHE_URL: ${{ secrets.BAZEL_REMOTE_CACHE_URL || '' }} -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/bazel-ci-smoke.yml line 17
- Likely real
- Yes, 97% confidence
A secret is exposed in the workflow-level `env:` block, making it available to every job and step in this workflow — including any untrusted code run in pull-request workflows. Scope secrets as narrowly as possible: prefer step-level `env:` so the secret is only available where it is actually needed.
BAZEL_REMOTE_CACHE_AUTH_HEADER: ${{ secrets.BAZEL_REMOTE_CACHE_AUTH_HEADER || '' }} -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/bazel-ci.yml line 49
- Likely real
- Yes, 97% confidence
A secret is exposed in the workflow-level `env:` block, making it available to every job and step in this workflow — including any untrusted code run in pull-request workflows. Scope secrets as narrowly as possible: prefer step-level `env:` so the secret is only available where it is actually needed.
BAZEL_REMOTE_CACHE_AUTH_HEADER: ${{ secrets.BAZEL_REMOTE_CACHE_AUTH_HEADER || '' }} -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/bazel-ci-smoke.yml line 16
- Likely real
- Yes, 97% confidence
A secret is exposed in the workflow-level `env:` block, making it available to every job and step in this workflow — including any untrusted code run in pull-request workflows. Scope secrets as narrowly as possible: prefer step-level `env:` so the secret is only available where it is actually needed.
BAZEL_REMOTE_CACHE_URL: ${{ secrets.BAZEL_REMOTE_CACHE_URL || '' }} -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 152
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 275
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 255
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 237
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 217
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 195
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 176
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 168
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 160
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 319
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 141
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 133
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 126
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 112
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 102
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 93
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 82
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/fuzz.yml line 30
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 482
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/c-chain-reexecution-benchmark-container.yml line 50
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/stale.yml line 9
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/stale@v10 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/self-hosted-load-tests.yaml line 35
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/publish_docker_image.yml line 16
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/publish_antithesis_images.yml line 25
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci.yml line 26
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-smoke.yml line 21
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 522
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 298
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 443
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 433
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 419
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 406
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 394
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 382
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 361
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/go-ci-pre-merge.yml line 339
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/upload-tmpnet-artifact/action.yml line 13
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build-linux-binaries.yml line 21
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/buf-push.yml line 17
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/bazel-ci.yml line 118
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/bazel-ci.yml line 107
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/bazel-ci.yml line 93
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/bazel-ci-smoke.yml line 82
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/bazel-ci-smoke.yml line 71
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/bazel-ci-smoke.yml line 57
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/packaging/actions/build-package/action.yml line 68
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/firewood-chaos-test.yml line 90
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/setup-task/action.yml line 29
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/cache/save@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/setup-task/action.yml line 14
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/cache/restore@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/setup-go-for-project/action.yml line 22
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/setup-go@v6 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/setup-bazel/action.yml line 44
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/cache/restore@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/setup-bazel/action.yml line 33
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/cache@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/install-nix/action.yml line 40
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/cache/restore@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/install-nix/action.yml line 33
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/cache/restore@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/collect-kind-diagnostics/action.yml line 19
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/actions/c-chain-reexecution-benchmark/action.yml line 160
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/c-chain-reexecution-benchmark-gh-native.yml line 104
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/claude-review.yml line 33
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml line 43
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/firewood-chaos-test.yml line 47
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/firewood-load-test.yml line 22
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build-linux-binaries.yml line 68
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/claude-review.yml line 18
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/c-chain-reexecution-benchmark-gh-native.yml line 50
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/c-chain-reexecution-benchmark-container.yml line 103
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build-macos-release.yml line 97
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build-macos-release.yml line 91
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build-macos-release.yml line 32
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build-linux-packages.yml line 130
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/download-artifact@v6 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build-linux-packages.yml line 90
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build-linux-packages.yml line 55
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build-linux-binaries.yml line 144
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build-linux-binaries.yml line 138
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build-linux-binaries.yml line 91
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/checkout@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build-linux-binaries.yml line 74
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v6 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /graft/coreth/internal/debug/flags.go line 317
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
The profiling 'pprof' endpoint is automatically exposed on /debug/pprof. This could leak information about the server. Instead, use `import "net/http/pprof"`. See https://www.farsightsecurity.com/blog/txt-record/go-remote-profiling-20161028/ for more information and mitigation.
if err := http.ListenAndServe(address, nil); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /graft/subnet-evm/internal/debug/flags.go line 317
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
The profiling 'pprof' endpoint is automatically exposed on /debug/pprof. This could leak information about the server. Instead, use `import "net/http/pprof"`. See https://www.farsightsecurity.com/blog/txt-record/go-remote-profiling-20161028/ for more information and mitigation.
if err := http.ListenAndServe(address, nil); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /graft/coreth/accounts/abi/bind/bind.go line 40
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
When working with web applications that involve rendering user-generated content, it's important to properly escape any HTML content to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. In Go, the `text/template` package does not automatically escape HTML content, which can leave your application vulnerable to these types of attacks. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to use the `html/template` package instead, which provides built-in functionality for HTML escaping. By using `html/template` to render your HTML content, you can help to ensure that your web application is more secure and less susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities.
"text/template" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /graft/subnet-evm/accounts/abi/bind/bind.go line 40
- Likely real
- Yes, 51% confidence
When working with web applications that involve rendering user-generated content, it's important to properly escape any HTML content to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. In Go, the `text/template` package does not automatically escape HTML content, which can leave your application vulnerable to these types of attacks. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to use the `html/template` package instead, which provides built-in functionality for HTML escaping. By using `html/template` to render your HTML content, you can help to ensure that your web application is more secure and less susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities.
"text/template" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /graft/coreth/plugin/evm/config/config.go line 218
- Likely real
- Yes, 50% confidence
Deserializing into `interface{}` allows arbitrary data structures and types, which can lead to security vulnerabilities (CWE-502). Use a concrete struct type instead.
var v interface{} if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &v); err != nil { return err } -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /graft/subnet-evm/plugin/evm/config/config.go line 223
- Likely real
- Yes, 50% confidence
Deserializing into `interface{}` allows arbitrary data structures and types, which can lead to security vulnerabilities (CWE-502). Use a concrete struct type instead.
var v interface{} if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &v); err != nil { return err } -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /network/peer/tls_config.go line 31
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Checks for disabling of TLS/SSL certificate verification. This should only be used for debugging purposes because it leads to vulnerability to MTM attacks.
return &tls.Config{ Certificates: []tls.Certificate{cert}, ClientAuth: tls.RequireAnyClientCert, // We do not use the TLS CA functionality to authenticate a // hostname. We only require an authenticated channel based on the // peer's public key. Therefore, we can safely skip CA verification. // // During our security audit by Quantstamp, this was investigated // and confirmed to be safe and correct. InsecureSkipVerify: true, //#nosec G402 MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13, KeyLogWriter: keyLogWriter, VerifyConnection: ValidateCertificate, } -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /graft/coreth/internal/debug/flags.go line 317
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 48% confidence
Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information.
if err := http.ListenAndServe(address, nil); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /graft/subnet-evm/internal/debug/flags.go line 317
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 48% confidence
Found an HTTP server without TLS. Use 'http.ListenAndServeTLS' instead. See https://golang.org/pkg/net/http/#ListenAndServeTLS for more information.
if err := http.ListenAndServe(address, nil); err != nil { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /graft/evm/rpc/http.go line 307
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'.
_, err = w.Write(encdata) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /vms/rpcchainvm/ghttp/http_client.go line 223
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'.
_, err := w.Write(resp.Body) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /vms/saevm/cmputils/cmputils.go line 44
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
If an attacker can supply values that the application then uses to determine which method or field to invoke, the potential exists for the attacker to create control flow paths through the application that were not intended by the application developers. This attack vector may allow the attacker to bypass authentication or access control checks or otherwise cause the application to behave in an unexpected manner.
if f, ok := typ.FieldByName(fieldName); !ok || f.Type != reflect.TypeFor[Field]() { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /chains/atomic/atomictest/shared_memory.go line 7
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 39% confidence
Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead.
"math/rand" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /network/tracked_ip.go line 7
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 39% confidence
Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead.
"math/rand" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /network/p2p/peer_tracker.go line 9
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 39% confidence
Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead.
"math/rand" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /graft/evm/sync/synctest/trie.go line 8
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 39% confidence
Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead.
"math/rand" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /graft/evm/rpc/subscription.go line 38
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 39% confidence
Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead.
"math/rand" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /graft/evm/core/state/snapshot/difflayer.go line 34
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 39% confidence
Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead.
"math/rand" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /graft/coreth/plugin/evm/atomic/atomictest/tx.go line 7
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 39% confidence
Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead.
"math/rand" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /database/dbtest/dbtest.go line 10
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 39% confidence
Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead.
"math/rand" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /database/dbtest/benchmark.go line 7
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 39% confidence
Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead.
"math/rand" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /graft/coreth/core/headerchain.go line 34
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 39% confidence
Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead.
mrand "math/rand" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /graft/subnet-evm/core/headerchain.go line 34
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 39% confidence
Do not use `math/rand`. Use `crypto/rand` instead.
mrand "math/rand" -
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /README.md
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
No findings match these filters.