Scan report
thorsten / phpMyFAQ
Could an attacker exploit mistakes in this code?
Serious issues. Review the high-severity findings before using it.
- High
- 13
- Medium
- 87
- Low
- 0
Sources: Bandit, Semgrep, pip-audit
Does this code look like it is trying to cause harm?
No issues of this kind were found.
- High
- 2
- Medium
- 0
- Low
- 2
Sources: YARA, ClamAV, GuardDog, dependency checker
- Likely real
- 63
- Uncertain
- 6
- Likely noise
- 35
The risk classifier rates every finding for how likely it is to be a real issue. Likely noise still counts, just much less.
What we found, in plain English
This repository has a high vulnerability score of 172.0, which means there are several dangerous coding patterns that an attacker could exploit if they gain access to the code. While the scan did not find any signs of intentional malicious behavior, it identified many issues related to how the application handles sensitive data and network connections. For example, the system logs debug information that could reveal secrets, uses weak password hashing algorithms, and allows anonymous users to connect to LDAP servers without proper authentication. Additionally, there are risks in Dockerfile configurations where containers might run as root, insecure redirects in nginx settings, and potential supply chain attacks through GitHub Actions workflows. These findings suggest the code is not safe for production use because it contains known security flaws rather than signs of deliberate harm.
Written by a local language model from the findings below. The risk scores come from the classifier, not from this summary.
Detections by engine
Score over time
Overall score each time this repository was scanned.
Findings
Highest severity first. Select a finding to see the code and what it means.
-
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.docker/frankenphp/frankenphp-worker.php line 21
- Likely real
- Yes, 96% confidence
Debug logging is explicitly enabled. This can potentially disclose sensitive information and should never be active on production systems.
ini_set('display_errors', 1); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Auth/AuthDatabase.php line 40
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
bcrypt hash detected
private const string DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH = '$2y$12$EGITAUZxbLyU7bB4wmlCJ.cJjeYZzAHfwavMg0WAJWPSSVNLwsxMe'; -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.docker/frankenphp/Dockerfile line 67
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 23% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
CMD [ "frankenphp", "run", "--config", "/etc/caddy/Caddyfile" ] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.docker/production/Dockerfile line 194
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 23% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
CMD ["frankenphp", "run", "--config", "/etc/frankenphp/Caddyfile"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /Dockerfile line 47
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
CMD ["./phpmyfaq/src/libs/bin/phpunit"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.docker/apache/Dockerfile line 88
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT [ "/entrypoint" ] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.docker/apache/Dockerfile line 91
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
CMD [ "apache2-foreground" ] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.docker/frankenphp/Dockerfile line 64
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT [ "/entrypoint" ] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.docker/php-fpm/Dockerfile line 81
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT [ "/entrypoint" ] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.docker/php-fpm/Dockerfile line 84
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
CMD [ "php-fpm" ] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.docker/production/Dockerfile line 136
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT ["docker-entrypoint"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.docker/production/Dockerfile line 137
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
CMD ["apache2-foreground"] -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.docker/production/Dockerfile line 193
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'.
ENTRYPOINT ["docker-entrypoint"] -
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /README.md
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /AGENTS.md
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/assets/src/search/highlight.ts line 27
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
RegExp() called with a `query` function argument, this might allow an attacker to cause a Regular Expression Denial-of-Service (ReDoS) within your application as RegExP blocks the main thread. For this reason, it is recommended to use hardcoded regexes instead. If your regex is run on user-controlled input, consider performing input validation or use a regex checking/sanitization library such as https://www.npmjs.com/package/recheck to verify that the regex does not appear vulnerable to ReDoS.
const regex = new RegExp(`(${escapeRegExp(trimmedQuery)})`, 'gi'); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/admin/assets/src/content/media.browser.ts line 24
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
RegExp() called with a `event` function argument, this might allow an attacker to cause a Regular Expression Denial-of-Service (ReDoS) within your application as RegExP blocks the main thread. For this reason, it is recommended to use hardcoded regexes instead. If your regex is run on user-controlled input, consider performing input validation or use a regex checking/sanitization library such as https://www.npmjs.com/package/recheck to verify that the regex does not appear vulnerable to ReDoS.
if (fileDiv.textContent && fileDiv.textContent.search(new RegExp(filter, 'i')) < 0) { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/admin/assets/src/content/faqs.autocomplete.ts line 65
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
RegExp() called with a `currentValue` function argument, this might allow an attacker to cause a Regular Expression Denial-of-Service (ReDoS) within your application as RegExP blocks the main thread. For this reason, it is recommended to use hardcoded regexes instead. If your regex is run on user-controlled input, consider performing input validation or use a regex checking/sanitization library such as https://www.npmjs.com/package/recheck to verify that the regex does not appear vulnerable to ReDoS.
const regex = new RegExp(currentValue, 'gi'); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml line 75
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
This GitHub Actions workflow file uses `workflow_run` and checks out code from the incoming pull request. When using `workflow_run`, the Action runs in the context of the target repository, which includes access to all repository secrets. Normally, this is safe because the Action only runs code from the target repository, not the incoming PR. However, by checking out the incoming PR code, you're now using the incoming code for the rest of the action. You may be inadvertently executing arbitrary code from the incoming PR with access to repository secrets, which would let an attacker steal repository secrets. This normally happens by running build scripts (e.g., `npm build` and `make`) or dependency installation scripts (e.g., `python setup.py install`). Audit your workflow file to make sure no code from the incoming PR is executed. Please see https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/ for additional mitigations.
- name: Checkout uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1 with: # For a nightly, build exactly the commit the nightly release was made from ref: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_sha || github.sha }} -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.docker/nginx/default.conf line 145
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected an insecure redirect in this nginx configuration. If no scheme is specified, nginx will forward the request with the incoming scheme. This could result in unencrypted communications. To fix this, include the 'https' scheme.
rewrite ^/admin/api/ /admin/api/index.php last; # Administration pages (redirect /admin to /admin/) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.docker/nginx/default.conf line 148
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected an insecure redirect in this nginx configuration. If no scheme is specified, nginx will forward the request with the incoming scheme. This could result in unencrypted communications. To fix this, include the 'https' scheme.
rewrite ^/admin$ /admin/ permanent; -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.docker/nginx/default.conf line 320
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected an insecure redirect in this nginx configuration. If no scheme is specified, nginx will forward the request with the incoming scheme. This could result in unencrypted communications. To fix this, include the 'https' scheme.
rewrite ^/admin/api/ /admin/api/index.php last; # Administration pages (redirect /admin to /admin/) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.docker/nginx/default.conf line 323
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected an insecure redirect in this nginx configuration. If no scheme is specified, nginx will forward the request with the incoming scheme. This could result in unencrypted communications. To fix this, include the 'https' scheme.
rewrite ^/admin$ /admin/ permanent; -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /nginx.conf line 118
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected an insecure redirect in this nginx configuration. If no scheme is specified, nginx will forward the request with the incoming scheme. This could result in unencrypted communications. To fix this, include the 'https' scheme.
rewrite ^/admin/api/ /admin/api/index.php last; # Administration pages (redirect /admin to /admin/) -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /nginx.conf line 121
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected an insecure redirect in this nginx configuration. If no scheme is specified, nginx will forward the request with the incoming scheme. This could result in unencrypted communications. To fix this, include the 'https' scheme.
rewrite ^/admin$ /admin/ permanent; -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Ldap.php line 144
- Likely real
- Yes, 100% confidence
Detected anonymous LDAP bind. This permits anonymous users to execute LDAP statements. Consider enforcing authentication for LDAP.
return @ldap_bind($this->ds, dn: null, password: null); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/admin/assets/src/content/media.browser.ts line 38
- Likely real
- Yes, 56% confidence
The target origin of the window.postMessage() API is set to "*". This could allow for information disclosure due to the possibility of any origin allowed to receive the message.
window.parent.postMessage( { mceAction: 'phpMyFAQMediaBrowserAction', url: src, }, '*' ); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml line 98
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: docker/metadata-action@v6.2.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/dev-nightly.yml line 20
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/dev-nightly.yml line 33
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: mathieudutour/github-tag-action@v6.2 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/dev-nightly.yml line 40
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: shivammathur/setup-php@v2 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/dev-nightly.yml line 51
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/cache@v6.1.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/dev-nightly.yml line 61
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/setup-node@v7.0.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/dev-nightly.yml line 66
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: pnpm/action-setup@v6.1.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/dev-nightly.yml line 79
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/cache@v6.1.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/dev-nightly.yml line 97
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v3.0.3 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml line 76
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml line 83
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v4.4.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml line 86
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v4.4.1 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml line 90
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: docker/login-action@v4.6.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/coverage-to-pages.yml line 69
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/deploy-pages@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml line 117
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: docker/build-push-action@v7.4.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml line 133
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: docker/build-push-action@v7.4.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/e2e.yml line 40
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/e2e.yml line 46
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: shivammathur/setup-php@v2 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/e2e.yml line 56
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/cache@v6.1.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/e2e.yml line 66
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/setup-node@v7.0.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/e2e.yml line 72
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: pnpm/action-setup@v6.1.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/e2e.yml line 91
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/e2e.yml line 99
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/semgrep.yml line 32
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/semgrep.yml line 52
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v4.38.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/coverage-to-pages.yml line 63
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/upload-pages-artifact@v5 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/4.1-nightly.yml line 20
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/4.1-nightly.yml line 35
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: mathieudutour/github-tag-action@v6.2 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/4.1-nightly.yml line 42
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: shivammathur/setup-php@v2 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/4.1-nightly.yml line 53
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/cache@v6.1.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/4.1-nightly.yml line 63
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/setup-node@v7.0.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/4.1-nightly.yml line 68
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: pnpm/action-setup@v6.1.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/4.1-nightly.yml line 81
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
- uses: actions/cache@v6.1.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/4.1-nightly.yml line 99
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v3.0.3 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/actionlint.yml line 22
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build.yml line 22
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build.yml line 25
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: shivammathur/setup-php@v2 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build.yml line 36
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/cache@v6.1.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build.yml line 64
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: mikepenz/action-junit-report@v6.5.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build.yml line 79
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/setup-node@v7.0.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build.yml line 85
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: pnpm/action-setup@v6.1.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/build.yml line 97
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/cache@v6.1.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml line 42
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml line 46
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: github/codeql-action/init@v4.38.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml line 51
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: github/codeql-action/autobuild@v4.38.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/codeql-analysis.yml line 54
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v4.38.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/coverage-to-pages.yml line 30
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/checkout@v7.0.1 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/coverage-to-pages.yml line 33
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: shivammathur/setup-php@v2 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/coverage-to-pages.yml line 43
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/cache@v6.1.0 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/workflows/coverage-to-pages.yml line 60
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. `uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608`.
uses: actions/configure-pages@v6 -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/prepare-release-artifacts.sh line 33
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 50% confidence
The special variable IFS affects how splitting takes place when expanding unquoted variables. Don't set it globally. Prefer a dedicated utility such as 'cut' or 'awk' if you need to split input data. If you must use 'read', set IFS locally using e.g. 'IFS="," read -a my_array'.
IFS=$(printf ' \t\n') -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/sign-release-artifacts.sh line 28
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 50% confidence
The special variable IFS affects how splitting takes place when expanding unquoted variables. Don't set it globally. Prefer a dedicated utility such as 'cut' or 'awk' if you need to split input data. If you must use 'read', set IFS locally using e.g. 'IFS="," read -a my_array'.
IFS=$(printf ' \t\n') -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/generate-sbom.sh line 44
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 50% confidence
The special variable IFS affects how splitting takes place when expanding unquoted variables. Don't set it globally. Prefer a dedicated utility such as 'cut' or 'awk' if you need to split input data. If you must use 'read', set IFS locally using e.g. 'IFS="," read -a my_array'.
IFS=$(printf ' \t\n') -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/generate-sbom.sh line 105
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
The special variable IFS affects how splitting takes place when expanding unquoted variables. Don't set it globally. Prefer a dedicated utility such as 'cut' or 'awk' if you need to split input data. If you must use 'read', set IFS locally using e.g. 'IFS="," read -a my_array'.
IFS=',' -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/generate-sbom.sh line 109
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
The special variable IFS affects how splitting takes place when expanding unquoted variables. Don't set it globally. Prefer a dedicated utility such as 'cut' or 'awk' if you need to split input data. If you must use 'read', set IFS locally using e.g. 'IFS="," read -a my_array'.
IFS="$_old_ifs" -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /kubernetes-deploy/01-phpmyfaq-deployment.yaml line 27
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 26% confidence
In Kubernetes, each pod runs in its own isolated environment with its own set of security policies. However, certain container images may contain `setuid` or `setgid` binaries that could allow an attacker to perform privilege escalation and gain access to sensitive resources. To mitigate this risk, it's recommended to add a `securityContext` to the container in the pod, with the parameter `allowPrivilegeEscalation` set to `false`. This will prevent the container from running any privileged processes and limit the impact of any potential attacks. By adding a `securityContext` to your Kubernetes pod, you can help to ensure that your containerized applications are more secure and less vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
name: phpmyfaq -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Category/Image.php line 182
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 21% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
return unlink(self::UPLOAD_DIR . $this->fileName); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/StatisticsHelper.php line 199
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 21% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
unlink(PMF_CONTENT_DIR . '/core/data/' . $trackingFile); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Upgrade.php line 583
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 21% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
if (!is_file($archive) || unlink($archive)) { -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/BackupController.php line 126
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 20% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
unlink($backupFile); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/User/CurrentUser.php line 403
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 20% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
unlink($sessionFilename); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Storage/FilesystemStorage.php line 104
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 20% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
$result = unlink($fullPath); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Upgrade.php line 616
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 20% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
unlink($filePath); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/UpdateToken.php line 93
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 20% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
unlink($tokenFilePath); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Installer.php line 59
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 20% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
unlink($ldapFile); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Installer.php line 54
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 20% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
unlink($databaseFile); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Routing/RouteCacheManager.php line 112
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 20% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
unlink($cacheFile); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/MediaBrowserController.php line 79
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 20% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
unlink($targetPath); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/ImageController.php line 159
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 20% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
unlink($filePath); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/ImageController.php line 131
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 20% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
unlink($filePath); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Attachment/Filesystem/AbstractFile.php line 200
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 20% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
unlink($file->getPathname()); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Administration/Backup.php line 232
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 20% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
unlink($zipFile); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Filesystem/Filesystem.php line 134
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 20% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
unlink($full); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/StatisticsHelper.php line 221
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 20% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
unlink($file); -
- Engine
- Semgrep · Pattern-based code analysis
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Routing/RouteCacheManager.php line 97
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 20% confidence
Using user input when deleting files with `unlink()` is potentially dangerous. A malicious actor could use this to modify or access files they have no right to.
unlink($file); -
- Engine
- Dependency checker · CVEs, typosquats and risky installs
- Counts towards
- Supply chain
- File
- package.json
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 2% confidence
Loose version constraint: 'stylelint^17.15.0' — attacker could push malicious update
stylelint:^17.15.0 -
- Engine
- Dependency checker · CVEs, typosquats and risky installs
- Counts towards
- Supply chain
- File
- package.json
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
Loose version constraint: 'stylelint-config-standard-scss^17.0.0' — attacker could push malicious update
stylelint-config-standard-scss:^17.0.0
No findings match these filters.