Scan report
sgl-project / sglang
Could an attacker exploit mistakes in this code?
Strong warning signs. Do not run or install this without a careful review.
- High
- 17
- Medium
- 309
- Low
- 8260
Sources: Bandit, Semgrep, pip-audit
Does this code look like it is trying to cause harm?
Strong warning signs. Do not run or install this without a careful review.
- High
- 58
- Medium
- 2
- Low
- 83
Sources: YARA, ClamAV, GuardDog, dependency checker
- Likely real
- 259
- Uncertain
- 155
- Likely noise
- 8,315
The risk classifier rates every finding for how likely it is to be a real issue. Likely noise still counts, just much less.
What we found, in plain English
This repository has been flagged as extremely dangerous by automated security tools, with a critical vulnerability score of 588.0 and a malicious-pattern score of 122.0, indicating that the code contains severe risks that could be exploited by attackers or signs of intentional harm. The most serious issues involve the use of dynamic code loading and downloading files from the internet to execute them at runtime, which allows an attacker to potentially run arbitrary malware if the code is shared publicly. Additionally, there are multiple instances where shell commands are started without proper validation, creating a high risk for command injection attacks that could allow attackers to execute system commands on your machine. While some findings relate to standard security practices like using deprecated functions or parsing untrusted XML data, these represent common insecure coding patterns rather than evidence of malicious intent. Because the code is hosted on GitHub and appears to be public, it should not be used in any production environment without a thorough review and complete removal of all identified dangerous components.
Written by a local language model from the findings below. The risk scores come from the classifier, not from this summary.
Detections by engine
Score over time
Overall score each time this repository was scanned.
Findings
Highest severity first. Select a finding to see the code and what it means.
Large result: showing the top 343 of 8,729 findings (up to 200 per engine, most severe and most likely real first). Totals above include everything.
-
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/utils/profiler.py line 16
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Detects suspicious autostart persistence mechanisms [threat-filesystem-autostart]
patches = [ ["profiler.profile", torch_npu.profiler.profile], ["profiler.schedule", torch_npu.profiler.schedule], ] -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/utils/profiler.py line 202
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Detects suspicious autostart persistence mechanisms [threat-filesystem-autostart]
with gzip.open(trace_path, "rb") as f: content = f.read() if content.count(b"\x1f\x8b") > 1: -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/common.py line 4226
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Detects dynamic code loading: downloading and importing/executing code at runtime [threat-runtime-dynamic-loader]
func_name = parts[-1] module = importlib.import_module(module_path) func = getattr(module, func_name) return func -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/common.py line 4515
- Likely real
- Yes, 99% confidence
Detects dynamic code loading: downloading and importing/executing code at runtime [threat-runtime-dynamic-loader]
try: current_module = importlib.import_module(current_path) except ModuleNotFoundError: # Handle missing module -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/common.py line 4518
- Likely real
- Yes, 98% confidence
Detects dynamic code loading: downloading and importing/executing code at runtime [threat-runtime-dynamic-loader]
# Handle missing module parent = importlib.import_module(parent_path) if parent_path else None if parent and hasattr(parent, part): # Use existing attribute from parent -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /benchmark/llava_bench/download_images.py line 18
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Detects download-and-execute patterns: fetching a remote file then executing it [threat-process-download-exec]
# Download the image using wget os.system(f"wget -O {image_path} {image_url}") print("Download complete.") -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /benchmark/mmlu/bench_sglang.py line 62
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Detects download-and-execute patterns: fetching a remote file then executing it [threat-process-download-exec]
tar_path = os.path.join(data_dir, "data.tar") subprocess.check_call( ["wget", "-O", tar_path, "https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~hendrycks/data.tar"] ) -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/kernels/aot/setup_metal.py line 69
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Detects download-and-execute patterns: fetching a remote file then executing it [threat-process-download-exec]
) subprocess.check_call( [sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "--upgrade", *missing] ) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/ci/slurm/analyze_logs_with_modal.py line 85
- Likely real
- Yes, 67% confidence
tarfile.extractall used without any validation. Please check and discard dangerous members.
84 else: 85 archive.extractall(destination) 86 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/parser/template_detection.py line 106
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 42% confidence
By default, jinja2 sets autoescape to False. Consider using autoescape=True or use the select_autoescape function to mitigate XSS vulnerabilities.
105 try: 106 env = jinja2.Environment( 107 extensions=[jinja2.ext.loopcontrols, _GenerationTagExtension] 108 ) 109 tree = env.parse(ctx.template) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/playground/lora/analyzer.py line 19
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 36% confidence
Starting a process with a shell, possible injection detected, security issue.
18 19 os.system(f"rm {output_file_prefix}*") 20 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/lora/launch_server.py line 37
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 36% confidence
Starting a process with a shell, possible injection detected, security issue.
36 print(cmd) 37 os.system(cmd) 38 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/llava_bench/download_images.py line 18
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 35% confidence
Starting a process with a shell, possible injection detected, security issue.
17 # Download the image using wget 18 os.system(f"wget -O {image_path} {image_url}") 19 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/debug_utils/model_truncator.py line 22
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 35% confidence
Starting a process with a shell, possible injection detected, security issue.
21 for pattern in ["generation_config.json", "*.py", "tokenizer*"]: 22 os.system(f"cp -rf {dir_input}/{pattern} {dir_output}") 23 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/code_sync/copy_from_oss.py line 135
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 33% confidence
subprocess call with shell=True identified, security issue.
134 if not dry_run: 135 subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, check=True) 136 except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/check_env.py line 452
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 33% confidence
subprocess call with shell=True identified, security issue.
451 mcc_output = ( 452 subprocess.check_output(f'"{mcc}" --version', shell=True) 453 .decode("utf-8") -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/check_env.py line 253
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 33% confidence
subprocess call with shell=True identified, security issue.
252 hipcc_output = ( 253 subprocess.check_output(f'"{hipcc}" --version', shell=True) 254 .decode("utf-8") -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/check_env.py line 178
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 33% confidence
subprocess call with shell=True identified, security issue.
177 nvcc_output = ( 178 subprocess.check_output(f'"{nvcc}" -V', shell=True) 179 .decode("utf-8") -
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.claude/skills/llm-torch-profiler-analysis/scripts/run_trtllm_pytorch_profile_host.sh
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 33% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_credential_harvester — References credential/secret material by name AND a deliberate outbound-send API in the same file - narrower than \'reads any env var\', which large legitimate codebases do constantly regardless of intent. Still not proof the two are connected (YARA can\'t trace data flow) - a known limitation, see NOTES.md
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/serving.py
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 33% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_credential_harvester — References credential/secret material by name AND a deliberate outbound-send API in the same file - narrower than \'reads any env var\', which large legitimate codebases do constantly regardless of intent. Still not proof the two are connected (YARA can\'t trace data flow) - a known limitation, see NOTES.md
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci_monitor/lark_notify.py
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 33% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_credential_harvester — References credential/secret material by name AND a deliberate outbound-send API in the same file - narrower than \'reads any env var\', which large legitimate codebases do constantly regardless of intent. Still not proof the two are connected (YARA can\'t trace data flow) - a known limitation, see NOTES.md
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci/utils/update_rerun_test_status.py
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 33% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_credential_harvester — References credential/secret material by name AND a deliberate outbound-send API in the same file - narrower than \'reads any env var\', which large legitimate codebases do constantly regardless of intent. Still not proof the two are connected (YARA can\'t trace data flow) - a known limitation, see NOTES.md
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /benchmark/hicache/bench_serving.py
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 33% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_credential_harvester — References credential/secret material by name AND a deliberate outbound-send API in the same file - narrower than \'reads any env var\', which large legitimate codebases do constantly regardless of intent. Still not proof the two are connected (YARA can\'t trace data flow) - a known limitation, see NOTES.md
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/apps/ComfyUI_SGLDiffusion/core/server_api.py
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 33% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_credential_harvester — References credential/secret material by name AND a deliberate outbound-send API in the same file - narrower than \'reads any env var\', which large legitimate codebases do constantly regardless of intent. Still not proof the two are connected (YARA can\'t trace data flow) - a known limitation, see NOTES.md
-
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.claude/skills/mechanical-refactor-verify/scripts/mechanical_refactor_reproduction_utils.py line 37
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 32% confidence
subprocess call with shell=True identified, security issue.
36 cmd, 37 shell=True, 38 cwd=cwd, 39 capture_output=True, 40 text=True, 41 ) 42 if check and result.returncode != 0: 43 raise RuntimeError(f"command failed: {cmd}\n{result.stderr.strip()}") 44 return result.stdout.strip() -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/common.py line 787
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 32% confidence
subprocess call with shell=True identified, security issue.
786 stderr=subprocess.PIPE, 787 shell=True, 788 text=True, 789 ) 790 791 if result.returncode != 0: 792 raise RuntimeError(f"hl-smi error: {result.stderr.strip()}") 793 794 # Parse the output to extract memory values in MiB -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/common.py line 872
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 32% confidence
subprocess call with shell=True identified, security issue.
871 stderr=subprocess.PIPE, 872 shell=True, 873 text=True, 874 ) 875 876 if result.returncode != 0: 877 raise RuntimeError(f"mthreads-gmi error: {result.stderr.strip()}") 878 879 # Parse the output to extract memory values 880 memory_values = [ 881 float(mem) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/cudacore_pyspy_dump_utils.py line 85
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 32% confidence
subprocess call with shell=True identified, security issue.
84 result = subprocess.run( 85 cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True 86 ) 87 logger.error(f"Pyspy dump for PID {pid} ({cmd}):\n{result.stdout}") 88 break -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/code_sync/copy_from_oss.py line 66
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 32% confidence
subprocess call with shell=True identified, security issue.
65 try: 66 subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, check=True, capture_output=True) 67 except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/common.py line 631
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 32% confidence
subprocess call with shell=True identified, security issue.
630 stderr=subprocess.PIPE, 631 shell=True, 632 text=True, 633 ) 634 if result.returncode != 0: 635 raise RuntimeError(f"rocm-smi error: {result.stderr.strip()}") 636 637 # Parse the output to extract memory values in MiB 638 memory_values = [ 639 float(mem.split("(")[0].strip()) / 1024 640 for mem in result.stdout.strip().split("\n") -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/code_sync/copy_from_oss.py line 164
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 32% confidence
subprocess call with shell=True identified, security issue.
163 try: 164 subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, check=True, capture_output=True) 165 except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e: -
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/utils/perf_logger.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 18% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_anti_analysis — Checks for a debugger, VM, or sandbox before continuing - a common malware evasion technique, essentially never present in ordinary application code
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/managers/memory_managers/host_memory_budget.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 18% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_anti_analysis — Checks for a debugger, VM, or sandbox before continuing - a common malware evasion technique, essentially never present in ordinary application code
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/state_capturer/routed_experts.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 3% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_base64_exec — Encoded payload decoded and then executed
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/multimodal/mm_utils.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 3% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_base64_exec — Encoded payload decoded and then executed
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/state_capturer/indexer_topk.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 3% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_base64_exec — Encoded payload decoded and then executed
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/common.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 3% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_base64_exec — Encoded payload decoded and then executed
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/pipelines_core/stages/model_specific_stages/minimax_h3/material_io.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 3% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_base64_exec — Encoded payload decoded and then executed
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/xeon.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/benchmarks/datasets.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/.claude/skills/sglang-diffusion-benchmark-profile/scripts/bench_diffusion_denoise.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/pipelines_core/stages/model_specific_stages/minimax_h3/material_io.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/entrypoints/http_server.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/debug_utils/dumper.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/utils.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/rocm-gfx1151.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/xpu.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/arm64.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/gateway.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/rocm.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.devcontainer/Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /benchmark/llava_bench/download_images.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /benchmark/hicache/bench_buffer_mode.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.github/workflows/release-whl-deepgemm.yml
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /sgl-model-gateway/README.md
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /sgl-model-gateway/e2e_test/infra/process_utils.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /3rdparty/amd/wheel/README.md
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci/slurm/launch_mi355x.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci/cuda/warmup_server.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci/slurm/analyze_logs_with_modal.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci/slurm/launch_gb200.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci/utils/diffusion/run_comparison.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci/utils/diffusion/generate_diffusion_dashboard.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci_monitor/ci_auto_bisect.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci/utils/install_rustup.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/Dockerfile.cu134
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 1% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_download_and_execute — Downloads a remote resource AND executes it - the actually dangerous combination, not just downloading alone
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/arm64.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_persistence_mechanism — Modifies a startup/scheduling location - legitimate application code essentially never does this
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/Dockerfile.cu134
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_persistence_mechanism — Modifies a startup/scheduling location - legitimate application code essentially never does this
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/rocm.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_persistence_mechanism — Modifies a startup/scheduling location - legitimate application code essentially never does this
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /sgl-model-gateway/scripts/setup-sccache.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_persistence_mechanism — Modifies a startup/scheduling location - legitimate application code essentially never does this
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.devcontainer/Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_persistence_mechanism — Modifies a startup/scheduling location - legitimate application code essentially never does this
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.git/index
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_persistence_mechanism — Modifies a startup/scheduling location - legitimate application code essentially never does this
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_persistence_mechanism — Modifies a startup/scheduling location - legitimate application code essentially never does this
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/xeon.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_persistence_mechanism — Modifies a startup/scheduling location - legitimate application code essentially never does this
-
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/function_call/minicpm5_detector.py line 115
- Likely real
- Yes, 98% confidence
Using xml.etree.ElementTree.XMLParser to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace xml.etree.ElementTree.XMLParser with its defusedxml equivalent function or make sure defusedxml.defuse_stdlib() is called
114 except TypeError: 115 parser = ET.XMLParser() 116 root = ET.fromstring(block, parser=parser) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/function_call/minicpm5_detector.py line 113
- Likely real
- Yes, 98% confidence
Using xml.etree.ElementTree.XMLParser to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace xml.etree.ElementTree.XMLParser with its defusedxml equivalent function or make sure defusedxml.defuse_stdlib() is called
112 try: 113 parser = ET.XMLParser(**{"strip_cdata": False}) # type: ignore[call-arg] 114 except TypeError: -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /benchmark/bench_linear_attention/bench_cutedsl_kda_decode.py line 434
- Likely real
- Yes, 98% confidence
Detects unicode homoglyphs and uncommon characters used for obfuscation [threat-runtime-obfuscation-unicode]
f" {'layout':>6} {'B':>5} {'H':>3} {'HV':>3} {'K':>3} {'V':>3} | " f"{'triton (μs)':>12} | " f"{'cutedsl (μs)':>13} | " f"{'speedup':>8} | " -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/hicache/bench_buffer_mode.py line 261
- Likely real
- Yes, 98% confidence
Use of insecure and deprecated function (mktemp).
260 def run_multiturn(server, args): 261 log_file = tempfile.mktemp(suffix=".jsonl") 262 cmd = [ -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/benchmarks/datasets.py line 175
- Likely real
- Yes, 97% confidence
Chmod setting a permissive mask 0o755 on file (script_path).
174 self._download_file(self.I2V_DOWNLOAD_SCRIPT_URL, script_path) 175 os.chmod(script_path, 0o755) 176 -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /sgl-model-gateway/scripts/run_benchmarks.py line 181
- Likely real
- Yes, 96% confidence
Detects access to sensitive files (credentials, configs, keys) [threat-filesystem-read]
def save_results_to_file( self, results: Dict[str, str], filename: str = "benchmark_results.env" ): """Save benchmark results to a file for CI consumption.""" -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/function_call/minicpm5_detector.py line 116
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
Using xml.etree.ElementTree.fromstring to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace xml.etree.ElementTree.fromstring with its defusedxml equivalent function or make sure defusedxml.defuse_stdlib() is called
115 parser = ET.XMLParser() 116 root = ET.fromstring(block, parser=parser) 117 else: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/function_call/minicpm5_detector.py line 118
- Likely real
- Yes, 52% confidence
Using xml.etree.ElementTree.fromstring to parse untrusted XML data is known to be vulnerable to XML attacks. Replace xml.etree.ElementTree.fromstring with its defusedxml equivalent function or make sure defusedxml.defuse_stdlib() is called
117 else: 118 root = ET.fromstring(block) 119 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/debug_utils/dump_comparator.py line 252
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of unsafe PyTorch load
251 try: 252 x = torch.load(path, weights_only=False) 253 except Exception as e: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/tools/build_modelopt_fp8_transformer.py line 630
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of unsafe PyTorch load
629 630 backbone_state = torch.load(backbone_ckpt_path, map_location="cpu")[ 631 "model_state_dict" -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/kernels/fused_moe_triton/tuning_fused_moe_triton_sep.py line 137
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of unsafe PyTorch load
136 moe_layers = num_layers - dense_layers 137 return torch.load( 138 f"{topk_ids_dir}/topk_ids_layer{i % moe_layers + dense_layers}_idx{i // moe_layers}.pt" 139 ) 140 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/dspark_sts_fit.py line 122
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of unsafe PyTorch load
121 for shard_path in shard_paths: 122 shard = torch.load(shard_path, map_location="cpu") 123 shard_logits = shard["logits"] -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/loader/weight_utils.py line 353
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of unsafe PyTorch load
352 ) 353 return torch.load(bin_file, map_location=device, weights_only=False) 354 raise -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/pipelines_core/stages/model_specific_stages/sana_wm/streaming.py line 558
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of unsafe PyTorch load
557 def _iload(_name): 558 return torch.load(f"{_SANAWM_INJECT_DIR}/{_name}.pt", map_location=device) 559 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/postprocess/rife_interpolator.py line 303
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of unsafe PyTorch load
302 303 state = torch.load(flownet_path, map_location="cpu", weights_only=False) 304 self.flownet.load_state_dict(convert(state), strict=False) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/debug_utils/dump_loader.py line 37
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of unsafe PyTorch load
36 try: 37 raw = torch.load(path, weights_only=False, map_location="cpu") 38 except Exception as e: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/debug_utils/dump_loader.py line 85
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of unsafe PyTorch load
84 path = self._directory / row["filename"] 85 output = torch.load(path, weights_only=False) 86 if isinstance(output, dict) and "value" in output: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/model_loader/weight_utils.py line 1308
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of unsafe PyTorch load
1307 ) 1308 return torch.load(bin_file, map_location="cpu", weights_only=False) 1309 raise -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/models/deepseek_ocr.py line 835
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of unsafe PyTorch load
834 if checkpoint is not None: 835 state_dict = torch.load(checkpoint) 836 image_encoder.load_state_dict( -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/models/deepseek_ocr.py line 1419
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of unsafe PyTorch load
1418 if checkpoint is not None: 1419 state_dict = torch.load(checkpoint) 1420 decoder_as_encoder.load_state_dict(state_dict, strict=True) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/model_loader/loader.py line 2088
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of weak SHA1 hash for security. Consider usedforsecurity=False
2087 ) -> str: 2088 h = hashlib.sha1(repr(sig_input).encode()) 2089 return h.hexdigest()[:16] -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/loader/component_loaders/vae_loader.py line 175
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of weak SHA1 hash for security. Consider usedforsecurity=False
174 ) 175 key = hashlib.sha1( 176 f"{os.path.realpath(component_model_path)}|{component_name}|{dtype}{layout}".encode() 177 ).hexdigest()[:16] 178 return os.path.join( -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/multimodal/processors/dots_note_omni.py line 77
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of weak SHA1 hash for security. Consider usedforsecurity=False
76 video_bytes = get_video_bytes(raw_url) 77 return video_bytes, hashlib.sha1(video_bytes).hexdigest() 78 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/multimodal/processors/dots_note_omni.py line 156
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of weak SHA1 hash for security. Consider usedforsecurity=False
155 } 156 record_key = hashlib.sha1(f"{video_id}|{question}".encode()).hexdigest() 157 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/multimodal/processors/dots_note_omni_video_core/flatten_runner.py line 17
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of weak SHA1 hash for security. Consider usedforsecurity=False
16 def _derive_seed(record_key: str) -> int: 17 digest = hashlib.sha1(f"42|flatten|{record_key}".encode()).hexdigest() 18 return int(digest[:8], 16) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/rank_consensus_checker.py line 407
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of weak SHA1 hash for security. Consider usedforsecurity=False
406 # Compute sha1 of concatenation of all msgs. 407 hasher = hashlib.sha1() 408 for msg in events: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/ci/cuda/warmup_deep_gemm.py line 387
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of weak MD5 hash for security. Consider usedforsecurity=False
386 args_blob = json.dumps(list(extra_args)) 387 args_hash = hashlib.md5(args_blob.encode()).hexdigest()[:8] 388 safe_model = model.replace("/", "--") -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/ci/utils/diffusion/publish_diffusion_gt.py line 103
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of weak SHA1 hash for security. Consider usedforsecurity=False
102 header = f"blob {len(content)}\0".encode() 103 return hashlib.sha1(header + content).hexdigest() 104 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/model_loader/loader.py line 1994
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of weak SHA1 hash for security. Consider usedforsecurity=False
1993 def _build_subfolder_name(self, shard_config: Dict[str, Any]) -> str: 1994 combined = hashlib.sha1( 1995 json.dumps(shard_config, sort_keys=True).encode() 1996 ).hexdigest()[:16] 1997 return f"TP-{shard_config['tp']}-sig-{combined}" -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/model_loader/loader.py line 1986
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of weak SHA1 hash for security. Consider usedforsecurity=False
1985 if value.endswith((".json", ".pt")) and os.path.isfile(value): 1986 h = hashlib.sha1() 1987 with open(value, "rb") as f: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/pipelines_core/lora/lora_merge_cache.py line 153
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of weak SHA1 hash for security. Consider usedforsecurity=False
152 return None 153 fname = hashlib.sha1(name.encode()).hexdigest()[:16] + ".safetensors" 154 path = os.path.join(self.root, fname) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/pipelines_core/lora/lora_merge_cache.py line 55
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of weak SHA1 hash for security. Consider usedforsecurity=False
54 parts.append(f"{real}|{size}|{strength}|{alpha}") 55 return hashlib.sha1("||".join(parts).encode()).hexdigest()[:16] 56 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/loader/host_spill.py line 82
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of weak SHA1 hash for security. Consider usedforsecurity=False
81 def _path(self, key: str) -> Path: 82 return self.directory / (hashlib.sha1(key.encode()).hexdigest() + ".bin") 83 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/loader/host_spill.py line 41
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of weak SHA1 hash for security. Consider usedforsecurity=False
40 """Identity of a checkpoint on disk: each shard's path, size and mtime.""" 41 digest = hashlib.sha1() 42 for weight_dir in sorted(str(d) for d in weight_dirs): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/model_loader/loader.py line 2082
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of weak SHA1 hash for security. Consider usedforsecurity=False
2081 return None 2082 return hashlib.sha1(repr(all_sigs).encode()).hexdigest()[:16] 2083 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/models/roberta.py line 279
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of unsafe PyTorch load
278 279 state_dict = torch.load(path) 280 return state_dict -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/models/sensenova_u1/neo_unify/modeling_fm_modules.py line 427
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Use of unsafe PyTorch load
426 ): 427 state_dict = torch.load(model_path, map_location="cpu") 428 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.claude/skills/llm-torch-profiler-analysis/scripts/probe_llm_server.py line 93
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
92 req = request.Request(url=url, method="GET") 93 with request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp: 94 raw = resp.read() -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.claude/skills/sglang-prod-incident-triage/scripts/incident_artifact_tool.py line 57
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
56 try: 57 with request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp: 58 body = resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace") -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/pipelines_core/stages/model_specific_stages/minimax_h3/material_io.py line 725
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
724 # policy or a cumulative request deadline. 725 with urllib.request.urlopen(uri, timeout=timeout_s) as response: 726 media_type = _http_media_type(response) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/utils.py line 218
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
217 context = ssl.create_default_context() 218 resp = urllib.request.urlopen(req, data=data, context=context) 219 else: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/utils.py line 220
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
219 else: 220 resp = urllib.request.urlopen(req, data=data, cafile=verify) 221 return HttpResponse(resp) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/ci/utils/update_rerun_test_status.py line 58
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
57 try: 58 with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=15) as resp: 59 return resp.status, resp.read().decode() -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/ci_monitor/lark_notify.py line 64
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
63 try: 64 with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60) as resp: 65 return json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8")) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/ci_monitor/lark_notify.py line 209
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
208 ) 209 with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as resp: 210 body = json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8")) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/playground/long_context_example.py line 17
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 49% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
16 try: 17 with urlopen(url, timeout=10) as response: 18 prompt = response.read().decode("utf-8") -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/mem_cache/storage/flexkv/verify_outputs.py line 75
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 48% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
74 ) 75 with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp: 76 return resp.read().decode() -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.claude/skills/llm-torch-profiler-analysis/scripts/profile_common.py line 225
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 48% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
224 try: 225 with request.urlopen(url, timeout=timeout) as response: 226 raw = response.read() -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.claude/skills/llm-torch-profiler-analysis/scripts/profile_common.py line 617
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 48% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
616 ) 617 with request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as response: 618 raw = response.read() -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.claude/skills/llm-torch-profiler-analysis/scripts/profile_common.py line 1015
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 48% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
1014 ) 1015 with request.urlopen(req, timeout=300.0): 1016 pass -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/ci/utils/diffusion/generate_diffusion_dashboard.py line 52
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 48% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
51 try: 52 with urlopen(req) as resp: 53 return json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8")) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /scripts/ci/utils/publish_traces.py line 68
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 48% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
67 try: 68 with urlopen(req) as response: 69 return response.read().decode("utf-8") -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.claude/skills/llm-torch-profiler-analysis/scripts/probe_llm_server.py line 86
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 48% confidence
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.
85 ) 86 with request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp: 87 raw = resp.read() -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/rpd_utils.py line 215
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Possible SQL injection vector through string-based query construction.
214 for row in connection.execute( 215 "select A.string as apiName, B.string as args, pid, tid, rocpd_hsaApi.start/1000.0, (rocpd_hsaApi.end-rocpd_hsaApi.start) / 1000.0 from rocpd_hsaApi INNER JOIN rocpd_string A on A.id = rocpd_hsaApi.apiName_id INNER Join rocpd_string B on B.id = rocpd_hsaApi.args_id %s order by rocpd_hsaApi.id" 216 % (rangeStringApi) 217 ): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/rpd_utils.py line 307
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Possible SQL injection vector through string-based query construction.
306 for row in connection.execute( 307 "select distinct deviceId, monitorType, max(end)/1000.0, value from rocpd_monitor %s group by deviceId, monitorType" 308 % (rangeStringMonitor) 309 ): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/rpd_utils.py line 298
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Possible SQL injection vector through string-based query construction.
297 for row in connection.execute( 298 "select deviceId, monitorType, start/1000.0, value from rocpd_monitor %s" 299 % (rangeStringMonitor) 300 ): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/rpd_utils.py line 197
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Possible SQL injection vector through string-based query construction.
196 for row in connection.execute( 197 "select rocpd_api_ops.id, pid, tid, gpuId, queueId, rocpd_api.end/1000.0 - 2, rocpd_op.start/1000.0 from rocpd_api_ops INNER JOIN rocpd_api on rocpd_api_ops.api_id = rocpd_api.id INNER JOIN rocpd_op on rocpd_api_ops.op_id = rocpd_op.id %s" 198 % (rangeStringApi) 199 ): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/rpd_utils.py line 152
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Possible SQL injection vector through string-based query construction.
151 for row in connection.execute( 152 "select A.string as apiName, B.string as args, pid, tid, rocpd_api.start/1000.0, (rocpd_api.end-rocpd_api.start) / 1000.0, (rocpd_api.end != rocpd_api.start) as has_duration from rocpd_api INNER JOIN rocpd_string A on A.id = rocpd_api.apiName_id INNER Join rocpd_string B on B.id = rocpd_api.args_id %s order by rocpd_api.id" 153 % (rangeStringApi) 154 ): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/rpd_utils.py line 137
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Possible SQL injection vector through string-based query construction.
136 for row in connection.execute( 137 "select graphExec, gpuId, queueId, min(start)/1000.0, (max(end)-min(start))/1000.0, count(*) from rocpd_graphLaunchapi A join rocpd_api_ops B on B.api_id = A.api_ptr_id join rocpd_op C on C.id = B.op_id %s group by api_ptr_id" 138 % (rangeStringMonitor) 139 ): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/rpd_utils.py line 122
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Possible SQL injection vector through string-based query construction.
121 for row in connection.execute( 122 "select A.string as optype, B.string as description, gpuId, queueId, rocpd_op.start/1000.0, (rocpd_op.end-rocpd_op.start) / 1000.0 from rocpd_op INNER JOIN rocpd_string A on A.id = rocpd_op.opType_id INNER Join rocpd_string B on B.id = rocpd_op.description_id %s" 123 % (rangeStringOp) 124 ): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/lora/eviction_policy.py line 124
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Possible SQL injection vector through string-based query construction.
123 # Should never reach here if candidates is non-empty 124 assert False, f"Failed to select FIFO victim from candidates: {candidates}" 125 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/lora/eviction_policy.py line 82
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Possible SQL injection vector through string-based query construction.
81 # Should never reach here if candidates is non-empty 82 assert False, f"Failed to select LRU victim from candidates: {candidates}" 83 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/rpd_utils.py line 262
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Possible SQL injection vector through string-based query construction.
261 for row in connection.execute( 262 'select * from (select rocpd_api.start/1000.0 as ts, "1" from rocpd_api_ops INNER JOIN rocpd_api on rocpd_api_ops.api_id = rocpd_api.id INNER JOIN rocpd_op on rocpd_api_ops.op_id = rocpd_op.id AND rocpd_op.gpuId = %s %s UNION ALL select rocpd_op.end/1000.0, "-1" from rocpd_api_ops INNER JOIN rocpd_api on rocpd_api_ops.api_id = rocpd_api.id INNER JOIN rocpd_op on rocpd_api_ops.op_id = rocpd_op.id AND rocpd_op.gpuId = %s %s) order by ts' 263 % (gpuId, rangeStringOp, gpuId, rangeStringOp) 264 ): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/rpd_utils.py line 363
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 46% confidence
Possible SQL injection vector through string-based query construction.
362 for row in connection.execute( 363 "SELECT '0', start/1000.0, pid, tid, B.string as label, '','','', '' from rocpd_api INNER JOIN rocpd_string A on A.id = rocpd_api.apiName_id AND A.string = 'UserMarker' INNER JOIN rocpd_string B on B.id = rocpd_api.args_id AND rocpd_api.start/1000.0 != rocpd_api.end/1000.0 %s UNION ALL SELECT '1', end/1000.0, pid, tid, B.string as label, '','','', '' from rocpd_api INNER JOIN rocpd_string A on A.id = rocpd_api.apiName_id AND A.string = 'UserMarker' INNER JOIN rocpd_string B on B.id = rocpd_api.args_id AND rocpd_api.start/1000.0 != rocpd_api.end/1000.0 %s UNION ALL SELECT '2', rocpd_api.start/1000.0, pid, tid, '' as label, gpuId, queueId, rocpd_op.start/1000.0, rocpd_op.end/1000.0 from rocpd_api_ops INNER JOIN rocpd_api ON rocpd_api_ops.api_id = rocpd_api.id INNER JOIN rocpd_op ON rocpd_api_ops.op_id = rocpd_op.id %s ORDER BY start/1000.0 asc" 364 % (rangeStringApi, rangeStringApi, rangeStringApi) 365 ): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/hicache/data_processing.py line 244
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 41% confidence
Use of possibly insecure function - consider using safer ast.literal_eval.
243 else: 244 qa_pairs = eval(data["qa_pairs"]) 245 for i, qa in enumerate(qa_pairs): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/mmmu/data_utils.py line 132
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 41% confidence
Use of possibly insecure function - consider using safer ast.literal_eval.
131 question = sample["question"] 132 options = eval(sample["options"]) 133 example = "" -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/debug_utils/comparator/threshold_dsl.py line 69
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 41% confidence
Use of possibly insecure function - consider using safer ast.literal_eval.
68 try: 69 eval(code, _EVAL_GLOBALS, dict(_DUMMY_ENV)) 70 except Exception as e: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/debug_utils/comparator/threshold_dsl.py line 81
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 41% confidence
Use of possibly insecure function - consider using safer ast.literal_eval.
80 return bool( 81 eval( 82 code, _EVAL_GLOBALS, {"rel": rel, "max_abs": max_abs, "mean_abs": mean_abs} 83 ) 84 ) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/debug_utils/dumper.py line 1320
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 41% confidence
Use of possibly insecure function - consider using safer ast.literal_eval.
1319 namespace.update(_FILTER_BUILTINS) 1320 return bool(eval(filter_expr, {"__builtins__": {}}, namespace)) 1321 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/rank_consensus_checker.py line 246
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 41% confidence
Use of possibly insecure function - consider using safer ast.literal_eval.
245 } 246 return eval(expr, {"__builtins__": safe_builtins}, dict(scope)) 247 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/io/bench_mm_token_padding.py line 58
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 40% confidence
Use of exec detected.
57 # Reuse dependency imports, but compile the original method bodies verbatim. 58 exec( 59 compile(ast.Module(body=classes, type_ignores=[]), f"{commit}:{path}", "exec"), 60 namespace, 61 ) 62 return commit, namespace["MultiModalityDataPaddingPatternMultimodalTokens"]() -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/debug_utils/source_patcher/code_patcher.py line 97
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 40% confidence
Use of exec detected.
96 temp_namespace: dict[str, Any] = {} 97 exec(code, target.__globals__, temp_namespace) 98 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/hicache/data_processing.py line 459
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
458 with open(cache_path, "rb") as f: 459 return pickle.load(f) 460 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/sampling/custom_logit_processor.py line 21
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
20 data = orjson.loads(json_str) 21 return dill.loads(bytes.fromhex(data["callable"])) 22 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/distributed/parallel_state.py line 1940
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
1939 1940 recv_metadata_list = pickle.loads(recv_meta_data.numpy()) 1941 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/distributed/parallel_state.py line 1662
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
1661 1662 obj = pickle.loads(object_tensor.numpy()) 1663 return obj -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/datasets/generated_shared_prefix.py line 202
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
201 with open(cache_path, "rb") as f: 202 return pickle.load(f) 203 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/managers/io_struct.py line 2532
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
2531 return obj 2532 return pickle.loads(obj.data) 2533 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/distributed/group_coordinator.py line 604
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
603 604 obj = pickle.loads(object_tensor.numpy().tobytes()) 605 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/distributed/device_communicators/shm_broadcast.py line 471
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
470 recv = self.remote_socket.recv() 471 obj = pickle.loads(recv) 472 else: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/models/registry.py line 237
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
236 with open(output_filepath, "rb") as f: 237 return cast(_T, pickle.load(f)) 238 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/managers/worker_bootstrap.py line 96
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
95 96 server_args = pickle.loads(self._pickle) 97 if not isinstance(server_args, ServerArgs): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/common.py line 2573
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
2572 serialized_data = bytes(tensor_data.cpu().numpy()) 2573 data = pickle.loads(serialized_data) 2574 return data -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/distributed/device_communicators/custom_all_reduce_utils.py line 320
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
319 with open(output_file.name, "rb") as f: 320 result = pickle.load(f) 321 for _i, _j, r in zip(batch_src, batch_tgt, result): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/common.py line 2638
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
2637 serialized_data = bytes(tensor_data.cpu().numpy()) 2638 data = pickle.loads(serialized_data) 2639 return data -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/mem_cache/storage/flexkv/flexkv_comm.py line 389
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
388 dist.irecv(t_data, src=src, tag=tag, group=group).wait() 389 return pickle.loads(t_data.numpy().tobytes()) 390 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/managers/multi_tokenizer_mixin.py line 802
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
801 shm = shared_memory.SharedMemory(name=name) 802 data = pickle.loads(bytes(shm.buf)) 803 shm.close() -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/managers/io_struct.py line 2576
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
2575 if isinstance(obj, PickleWrapper): 2576 obj = pickle.loads(obj.data) 2577 if envs.SGLANG_LOG_PICKLE_IPC_OBJECTS.get(): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/distributed/utils.py line 207
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
206 key = f"broadcast_from/{src}/{self.broadcast_recv_src_counter[src]}" 207 recv_obj = pickle.loads(self.store.get(key)) 208 self.broadcast_recv_src_counter[src] += 1 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/distributed/utils.py line 187
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
186 """Receive an object from a source rank.""" 187 obj = pickle.loads( 188 self.store.get(f"send_to/{self.rank}/{self.recv_src_counter[src]}") 189 ) 190 self.recv_src_counter[src] += 1 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/distributed/naive_distributed.py line 87
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
86 if p.exists() and (text := p.read_text()).endswith(text_postfix): 87 return pickle.loads( 88 pybase64.b64decode(text[: -len(text_postfix)], validate=True) 89 ) 90 time.sleep(0.001) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/distributed/device_communicators/shm_broadcast.py line 468
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
467 recv = self.local_socket.recv() 468 obj = pickle.loads(recv) 469 elif self._is_remote_reader: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/distributed/device_communicators/shm_broadcast.py line 465
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
464 # see https://docs.python.org/3/library/pickle.html 465 obj = pickle.loads(buf[1:]) 466 if overflow: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/distributed/device_communicators/custom_all_reduce_utils.py line 516
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
515 if __name__ == "__main__": 516 batch_src, batch_tgt, output_file = pickle.loads(sys.stdin.buffer.read()) 517 result = can_actually_p2p(batch_src, batch_tgt) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.claude/skills/sglang-prod-incident-triage/scripts/incident_artifact_tool.py line 536
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
535 with path.open("rb") as fh: 536 payload = pickle.load(fh) 537 if isinstance(payload, dict): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/checkpoint_engine/update.py line 186
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
185 with open(load_metas_file, "rb") as f: 186 metas = pickle.load(f) 187 ps.init_process_group() -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/scheduler_client.py line 291
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
290 payload = await socket.recv() 291 output_batch = pickle.loads(payload) 292 _materialize_output_batch_file_refs(output_batch) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/scheduler_client.py line 94
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
93 payload = await socket.recv() 94 request_batch = pickle.loads(payload) 95 logger.debug("Broker received an offline job from a client.") -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/managers/scheduler.py line 1200
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
1199 identity, payload = parts[0], parts[-1] 1200 reqs = pickle.loads(payload) if len(parts) > 2 else [] 1201 except (pickle.UnpicklingError, IndexError, EOFError): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/distributed/utils.py line 254
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
253 serialized_data = bytes(tensor_data.cpu().numpy()) 254 data = pickle.loads(serialized_data) 255 return data -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/distributed/utils.py line 148
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
147 key = f"broadcast_from/{src}/{self.broadcast_recv_src_counter[src]}" 148 recv_obj = pickle.loads(self.store.get(key)) 149 self.broadcast_recv_src_counter[src] += 1 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/distributed/utils.py line 128
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
127 """Receive an object from a source rank.""" 128 obj = pickle.loads( 129 self.store.get(f"send_to/{self.rank}/{self.recv_src_counter[src]}") 130 ) 131 self.recv_src_counter[src] += 1 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/disaggregation/scheduler_mixin.py line 1657
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
1656 pickled_req = frames[-1] 1657 reqs = pickle.loads(pickled_req) 1658 if not isinstance(reqs, list): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/disaggregation/orchestrator.py line 459
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
458 try: 459 reqs = pickle.loads(payload) 460 except (pickle.UnpicklingError, EOFError): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.claude/skills/sglang-prod-incident-triage/scripts/replay_trusted_request_dump.py line 94
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 38% confidence
Pickle and modules that wrap it can be unsafe when used to deserialize untrusted data, possible security issue.
93 with path.open("rb") as fh: 94 payload = pickle.load(fh) 95 if isinstance(payload, dict) and "requests" in payload: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/server_args/server_args.py line 3060
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
3059 host = self.host 3060 if not host or host == "0.0.0.0": 3061 host = "127.0.0.1" -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /sgl-model-gateway/e2e_test/k8s_integration/fake_worker.py line 79
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
78 if __name__ == "__main__": 79 server = HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", PORT), FakeWorkerHandler) 80 print(f"Fake worker listening on port {PORT}", flush=True) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /sgl-model-gateway/bindings/python/src/sglang_router/router_args.py line 488
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
487 type=str, 488 default="0.0.0.0", 489 help="Host address to bind the Prometheus metrics server. Supports IPv4, IPv6 (e.g., ::, ::1), or 0.0.0.0 for all interfaces", -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /sgl-model-gateway/bindings/python/src/sglang_router/router_args.py line 41
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
40 worker_urls: List[str] = dataclasses.field(default_factory=list) 41 host: str = "0.0.0.0" 42 port: int = 30000 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/utils.py line 494
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
493 494 def launch_server_cmd(command: str, host: str = "0.0.0.0", port: int = None): 495 """ -
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- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/network.py line 325
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
324 )[0][4][0] 325 if ip and ip not in ("127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0", "::1"): 326 return ip -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/network.py line 282
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
281 ip = addr_info.get("addr") 282 if ip and ip != "127.0.0.1" and ip != "0.0.0.0": 283 return ip -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/network.py line 134
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
133 except socket.gaierror: 134 fallback_host = "0.0.0.0" if host is None else host 135 return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 0, "", (fallback_host, port))] -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/server_args.py line 372
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
371 host = self.host 372 if not host or host == "0.0.0.0": 373 host = "127.0.0.1" -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/mem_cache/storage/hf3fs/mini_3fs_metadata_server.py line 513
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
512 parser.add_argument( 513 "--host", type=str, default="0.0.0.0", help="Host to bind the server to." 514 ) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/mem_cache/storage/hf3fs/mini_3fs_metadata_server.py line 495
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
494 def run_metadata_server( 495 host: str = "0.0.0.0", 496 port: int = 18000, 497 persistence_path: Optional[str] = None, 498 save_interval: int = 60, 499 ): -
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- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/mem_cache/storage/hf3fs/mini_3fs_metadata_server.py line 316
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
315 316 def run(self, host: str = "0.0.0.0", port: int = 18000): 317 """Run the metadata server.""" -
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- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/entrypoints/sidecar.py line 35
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
34 def _loopback_host(host: str) -> str: 35 if not host or host == "0.0.0.0": 36 return "127.0.0.1" -
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- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/distributed/device_communicators/shm_broadcast.py line 194
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
193 connect_ip = ( 194 get_local_ip_auto("0.0.0.0") if n_remote_reader > 0 else "127.0.0.1" 195 ) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/disaggregation/kv_events.py line 465
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
464 or "::" in self._endpoint 465 or "0.0.0.0" in self._endpoint 466 or self._endpoint.startswith("ipc://") -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/disaggregation/kv_events.py line 86
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
85 # substring test would wrongly call a concrete remote host bindable. 86 _BIND_WILDCARD_HOSTS = frozenset({"*", "0.0.0.0", "::"}) 87 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/disaggregation/encoder/http_server.py line 180
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
179 host = get_serving().host 180 if not host or host in ("0.0.0.0", "::"): 181 host = get_local_ip_auto(get_serving().host) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/disaggregation/encoder/http_server.py line 119
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
118 host = get_serving().host 119 if not host or host in ("0.0.0.0", "::"): 120 host = get_local_ip_auto(get_serving().host) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/disaggregation/common/conn.py line 1130
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
1129 return 1130 registry_host = {"0.0.0.0": "127.0.0.1", "::": "::1"}.get( 1131 self.bootstrap_host, self.bootstrap_host -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/disaggregation/common/conn.py line 1096
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
1095 # e.g. IPv6 while the server is bound to 0.0.0.0.) 1096 host = {"0.0.0.0": "127.0.0.1", "::": "::1"}.get(host, host) 1097 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/debug_utils/dumper.py line 1559
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
1558 ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname) 1559 if ip and ip != "127.0.0.1" and ip != "0.0.0.0": 1560 return ip -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/hicache/bench_serving.py line 802
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
801 parser.add_argument( 802 "--host", type=str, default="0.0.0.0", help="Default host is 0.0.0.0." 803 ) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/lora/lora_bench.py line 455
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
454 parser.add_argument( 455 "--host", type=str, default="0.0.0.0", help="Default host is 0.0.0.0." 456 ) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/serving.py line 2231
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
2230 parser.add_argument( 2231 "--host", type=str, default="0.0.0.0", help="Default host is 0.0.0.0." 2232 ) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/disaggregation/scheduler_mixin.py line 77
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
76 host = server_args.disagg_p2p_hostname or server_args.host or "127.0.0.1" 77 if host == "0.0.0.0": 78 host = server_args.disagg_p2p_hostname or "127.0.0.1" -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/disaggregation/scheduler_mixin.py line 79
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
78 host = server_args.disagg_p2p_hostname or "127.0.0.1" 79 return server_args.pool_work_endpoint.replace("0.0.0.0", host) 80 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/server_args/disagg.py line 62
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
61 def derive_pool_work_endpoint(self) -> str: 62 return format_tcp_endpoint("0.0.0.0", self.scheduler_port, "pool_work_endpoint") 63 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/server_args/disagg.py line 66
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
65 return format_tcp_endpoint( 66 "0.0.0.0", self.scheduler_port + 1, "pool_control_endpoint" 67 ) 68 69 def derive_pool_control_advertised_endpoint(self) -> str: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/server_args/disagg.py line 71
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
70 host = self.host or self.disagg_p2p_hostname or "127.0.0.1" 71 if host == "0.0.0.0": 72 host = self.disagg_p2p_hostname or "127.0.0.1" -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/debug_utils/dumper.py line 1399
- Likely real
- Uncertain, 37% confidence
Possible binding to all interfaces.
1398 handler_class = _make_http_handler(prefix=prefix, target=target) 1399 server = HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", http_port), handler_class) 1400 thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/profiler.py line 18
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
17 18 PROFILER_DIR = os.getenv("SGLANG_TORCH_PROFILER_DIR", "/tmp") 19 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/stale_shm_cleanup.py line 20
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
19 20 _SHM_DIR = Path("/dev/shm") 21 _SGL_SHM_PREFIX = "sgl_shm" -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/hardware_backend/npu/graph_runner/npu_graph_runner.py line 212
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
211 output_dir = os.path.join( 212 os.getenv("SGLANG_TORCH_PROFILER_DIR", "/tmp"), "graph_capture_profile" 213 ) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/managers/configure_logging.py line 40
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
39 parser.add_argument( 40 "--dump-requests-folder", type=str, default="/tmp/sglang_request_dump" 41 ) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/offloader.py line 228
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
227 world_size=dp_size, 228 rendezvous=f"/tmp/{run_id}", 229 ) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/numa_utils.py line 85
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
84 path = Path( 85 f"/tmp/sglang_temp_file_{time.time()}_{random.randrange(0, 10000000)}.sh" 86 ) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/model_loader/ci_weight_validation.py line 650
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
649 return f"/dev/shm/sglang_download_lock_{key_hash}" 650 return f"/tmp/sglang_download_lock_{key_hash}" 651 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/model_loader/ci_weight_validation.py line 649
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
648 if os.path.isdir("/dev/shm"): 649 return f"/dev/shm/sglang_download_lock_{key_hash}" 650 return f"/tmp/sglang_download_lock_{key_hash}" -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/model_loader/ci_weight_validation.py line 648
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
647 648 if os.path.isdir("/dev/shm"): 649 return f"/dev/shm/sglang_download_lock_{key_hash}" -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/model_loader/ci_weight_validation.py line 28
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
27 # Markers are per CI run; sharing them across runners leaks cache state. 28 base_dir = os.environ.get("RUNNER_TEMP", os.environ.get("TMPDIR", "/tmp")) 29 marker_dir = os.path.join(base_dir, "sglang_ci_offline_markers") -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/mem_cache/storage/nixl/hicache_nixl.py line 75
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
74 storage_config: HiCacheStorageConfig, 75 file_path: str = "/tmp/hicache_storage", 76 ): 77 """Initialize NIXL storage connector.""" 78 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/mem_cache/storage/mmap/mmap_allocator.py line 202
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
201 # Fallback to creating a file in /dev/shm if memfd_create is not supported 202 shm_path = f"/dev/shm/sglang_host_pool_{uuid.uuid4().hex}.mmap" 203 try: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/mem_cache/storage/flexkv/verify_outputs.py line 109
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
108 "--baseline-file", 109 default="/tmp/flexkv_baseline.json", 110 help="where to write/read the baseline outputs", -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/mem_cache/hicache_storage.py line 381
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
380 def __init__( 381 self, storage_config: HiCacheStorageConfig, file_path: str = "/tmp/hicache" 382 ): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/managers/scheduler_components/profiler_manager.py line 127
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
126 if output_dir is None: 127 output_dir = os.getenv("SGLANG_TORCH_PROFILER_DIR", "/tmp") 128 if activities is None: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/managers/load_snapshot.py line 299
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
298 digest = hashlib.blake2s(ipc_name.encode(), digest_size=4).hexdigest() 299 return f"/dev/shm/sglang_loads_{safe_name}_{digest}.shm" 300 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/profile_utils.py line 117
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
116 if output_dir is None: 117 output_dir = os.getenv("SGLANG_TORCH_PROFILER_DIR", "/tmp") 118 if activities is None: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/hardware_backend/mlx/profiler.py line 222
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
221 def _new_temp_gputrace_path() -> Path: 222 output_dir = Path(os.getenv("SGLANG_TORCH_PROFILER_DIR", "/tmp")).expanduser() 223 output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/environ.py line 1824
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
1823 SGLANG_WEIGHT_CACHE_READY_TEMPLATE = EnvStr( 1824 "/tmp/sglang_weight_cache_{device_uuid}.ready" 1825 ) 1826 1827 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/environ.py line 1821
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
1820 SGLANG_WEIGHT_CACHE_SOCKET_TEMPLATE = EnvStr( 1821 "/tmp/sglang_weight_cache_{device_uuid}.sock" 1822 ) 1823 SGLANG_WEIGHT_CACHE_READY_TEMPLATE = EnvStr( 1824 "/tmp/sglang_weight_cache_{device_uuid}.ready" -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/environ.py line 1136
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
1135 SGLANG_LOG_EXPERT_LOCATION_METADATA = EnvBool(False) 1136 SGLANG_EXPERT_DISTRIBUTION_RECORDER_DIR = EnvStr("/tmp") 1137 SGLANG_EPLB_HEATMAP_COLLECTION_INTERVAL = EnvInt(0) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/environ.py line 466
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
465 SGLANG_GRAPH_BATCH_CAPTURE = EnvBool(False) 466 SGLANG_TORCH_PROFILER_DIR = EnvStr("/tmp") 467 # Allocator-history buffer for /start_profile activities=["MEM"]; the -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/disaggregation/encoder/server.py line 2429
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
2428 2429 output_dir = obj.output_dir or os.getenv("SGLANG_TORCH_PROFILER_DIR", "/tmp") 2430 os.makedirs(output_dir, exist_ok=True) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/debug_utils/text_comparator.py line 230
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
229 parser.add_argument( 230 "--output-path", type=str, default="/tmp/text_comparator_output.json" 231 ) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/debug_utils/dumper.py line 140
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
139 filter: Optional[str] = None 140 dir: str = "/tmp/dumper" 141 enable_output_file: bool = True -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/debug_utils/cuda_coredump.py line 42
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
41 else: 42 base = "/tmp/sglang_cuda_coredumps" 43 # Isolate dumps per (run, attempt): on a shared self-hosted runner a leftover -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/debug_utils/comparator/entrypoint.py line 416
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
415 type=str, 416 default="/tmp/comparator_viz/", 417 help="Output directory for visualization PNGs (default: /tmp/comparator_viz/)", -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/arg_groups/serving_hook.py line 153
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
152 "CUDA_COREDUMP_FILE": f"{cfg.crash_dump_folder}/%h/core.cuda.%t.%p", 153 "CUDA_COREDUMP_PIPE": "/tmp/corepipe.cuda.%h.%p", 154 } 155 for key, value in _CUDA_COREDUMP_DEFAULTS.items(): 156 if key not in os.environ: 157 os.environ[key] = value 158 logger.info("Auto-set %s=%s (from --crash-dump-folder)", key, value) 159 160 coredump_dir = os.path.dirname( 161 os.environ["CUDA_COREDUMP_FILE"].replace("%h", socket.gethostname()) 162 ) 163 if "%" in coredump_dir: 164 logger.warning( -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/ipc_array.py line 142
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
141 def _array_ipc_dir() -> str | None: 142 shm_path = Path("/dev/shm") 143 if shm_path.is_dir() and os.access(shm_path, os.W_OK): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/utils.py line 390
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
389 if filename is None: 390 filename = os.path.join("/tmp", url.split("/")[-1]) 391 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /tools/sglang-simulator/src/sglang_simulator/simulation/manager/env.py line 23
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
22 SGLANG_SIMULATOR_OUTPUT_DIR = os.getenv( 23 "SGLANG_SIMULATOR_OUTPUT_DIR", "/tmp/sglang_simulator/output/" 24 ) 25 SGLANG_SIMULATOR_OUTPUT_DIR = os.path.realpath(SGLANG_SIMULATOR_OUTPUT_DIR) 26 if os.path.exists(SGLANG_SIMULATOR_OUTPUT_DIR) and os.path.isfile( -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /tools/sglang-simulator/src/sglang_simulator/simulation/manager/env.py line 42
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
41 "SGLANG_SIMULATOR_HICACHE_STORAGE_KEYS_PATH", 42 "/tmp/sglang_simulator/hicache_storage_keys.txt", 43 ) 44 return SGLANG_SIMULATOR_HICACHE_STORAGE_KEYS_PATH 45 46 @classmethod -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/hicache/bench_buffer_mode.py line 230
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
229 log_stem = os.path.splitext(os.path.basename(self.args.out))[0] 230 self.log = open(f"/tmp/{log_stem}_{self.mode}_server.log", "w") 231 self.proc = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=self.log, stderr=self.log, env=env) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/simulator/bench_runner.py line 17
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
16 SGLANG_SIMULATOR_OUTPUT_DIR = os.getenv( 17 "SGLANG_SIMULATOR_OUTPUT_DIR", "/tmp/sglang_simulator/output" 18 ) 19 SIMULATION_METRICS_PATH = f"{SGLANG_SIMULATOR_OUTPUT_DIR}/metrics.json" 20 os.environ["SGLANG_SIMULATOR_OUTPUT_DIR"] = SGLANG_SIMULATOR_OUTPUT_DIR -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/simulator/bench_serving.py line 44
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
43 output_dir = Path( 44 os.getenv("SGLANG_SIMULATOR_OUTPUT_DIR", "/tmp/sglang_simulator/output") 45 ) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/datasets/mooncake.py line 35
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
34 if not self.dataset_path: 35 local_path = os.path.join("/tmp", self.mooncake_workload + "_trace.jsonl") 36 else: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/one_batch.py line 650
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
649 def _get_torch_profiler_output_dir(): 650 return os.environ.get("SGLANG_TORCH_PROFILER_DIR", "/tmp") 651 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/serving.py line 855
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
854 if output_dir is None: 855 output_dir = os.getenv("SGLANG_TORCH_PROFILER_DIR", "/tmp") 856 output_dir = Path(os.path.abspath(os.path.normpath(output_dir))) / str( -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/utils.py line 98
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 25% confidence
Probable insecure usage of temp file/directory.
97 if filename is None: 98 filename = os.path.join("/tmp", url.split("/")[-1]) 99 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/serving.py line 1795
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
Call to requests without timeout
1794 1795 resp = requests.get(base_url + "/server_info", headers=get_auth_headers()) 1796 server_info = resp.json() if resp.status_code == 200 else None -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/serving.py line 2060
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
Call to requests without timeout
2059 try: 2060 response = requests.get(model_url, headers=get_auth_headers()) 2061 model_list = response.json().get("data", []) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/serving.py line 1598
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
Call to requests without timeout
1597 if "sglang" in backend: 1598 server_info = requests.get( 1599 base_url + "/server_info", headers=get_auth_headers() 1600 ) 1601 if server_info.status_code == 200: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/serving.py line 995
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
Call to requests without timeout
994 else: 995 response = requests.post(base_url + "/flush_cache", headers=get_auth_headers()) 996 response.raise_for_status() -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/serving.py line 989
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
Call to requests without timeout
988 elif backend.startswith("sglang"): 989 response = requests.post( 990 base_url + "/flush_cache", 991 headers=get_auth_headers(), 992 params={"timeout": flush_cache_timeout}, 993 ) 994 else: -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/serving.py line 985
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
Call to requests without timeout
984 if backend.startswith("vllm"): 985 response = requests.post( 986 base_url + "/reset_prefix_cache", headers=get_auth_headers() 987 ) 988 elif backend.startswith("sglang"): -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/hicache/bench_serving.py line 728
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
Call to requests without timeout
727 try: 728 response = requests.get(model_url) 729 model_list = response.json().get("data", []) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/hicache/bench_serving.py line 447
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
Call to requests without timeout
446 if "sglang" in backend: 447 requests.post(base_url + "/flush_cache") 448 -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/hicache/bench_multiturn.py line 764
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
Call to requests without timeout
763 args.request_rate = rate 764 requests.post(flush_cache_url) 765 time.sleep(1) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /benchmark/hicache/bench_long_context.py line 97
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
Call to requests without timeout
96 args.request_rate = request_rate 97 requests.post(flush_cache_url) 98 time.sleep(1) -
- Engine
- Bandit · Python security linter
- Counts towards
- Vulnerability
- File
- /.github/update_ci_permission.py line 82
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 22% confidence
Call to requests without timeout
81 while url: 82 response = requests.get(url, headers=HEADERS, params=params) 83 if response.status_code != 200: -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/entrypoints/http_server.py line 2128
- Likely real
- Yes, 95% confidence
Detects heavy obfuscation techniques commonly used by malware [threat-runtime-obfuscation]
..."iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAACAAAAAgCAYAAABzenr0AAAACXBIWXMAAA7EAAAOxAGVKw4bAAAAbUlEQVRYhe3VsQ2AMAxE0Y/lIgNQULD/OqyCMgCihCKSG4yRuKuiNH6JLsoEbMACOGBcua9HOR7Y6w6swBwMy0qLTpkeI77qdEBpBFAHBBDAGH8WrwJKI4AAegUCfAKgEgpQDvh3CR3oQCuav58qlAw73kKCSgAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==... -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/common.py line 200
- Likely real
- Yes, 93% confidence
Detects active collection of system information (hostname, platform, architecture, user) [threat-runtime-system-info]
def is_host_cpu_x86() -> bool: machine = platform.machine().lower() return ( machine in ("x86_64", "amd64", "i386", "i686") -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/common.py line 209
- Likely real
- Yes, 93% confidence
Detects active collection of system information (hostname, platform, architecture, user) [threat-runtime-system-info]
def is_host_cpu_arm64() -> bool: machine = platform.machine().lower() return ( machine in ("aarch64", "arm64") -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/utils/common.py line 3665
- Likely real
- Yes, 93% confidence
Detects active collection of system information (hostname, platform, architecture, user) [threat-runtime-system-info]
raise RuntimeError( f"{what} did not return within {timeout_s}s on {socket.gethostname()}" ) if error: -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.github/audit_permission.py line 331
- Likely real
- Yes, 93% confidence
Detects reading of environment variables (credential access, often contains secrets) [threat-runtime-environment-read]
gh_token = os.getenv("GH_TOKEN") if not gh_token: print("Error: GH_TOKEN environment variable is not set.", file=sys.stderr) -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.github/update_ci_permission.py line 181
- Likely real
- Yes, 93% confidence
Detects reading of environment variables (credential access, often contains secrets) [threat-runtime-environment-read]
gh_token = os.getenv("GH_TOKEN") if not gh_token: raise ValueError("Error: GH_TOKEN environment variable is not set.") -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/managers/scheduler.py line 6029
- Likely real
- Yes, 92% confidence
Detects memory scraping and credential dumping from process memory [threat-process-memory]
) parent_process = psutil.Process().parent() # Set up tracing -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/managers/multi_tokenizer_mixin.py line 798
- Likely real
- Yes, 92% confidence
Detects memory scraping and credential dumping from process memory [threat-process-memory]
def read_from_shared_memory(name: str) -> Any: """Read data from shared memory""" try: -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/managers/multi_tokenizer_mixin.py line 644
- Likely real
- Yes, 92% confidence
Detects memory scraping and credential dumping from process memory [threat-process-memory]
configure_logger(server_args) parent_process = psutil.Process().parent() router = None -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/entrypoints/utils.py line 652
- Likely real
- Yes, 83% confidence
Detects fully silent process execution (suppressing all output channels) [threat-process-spawn-silent]
check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, ) -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/entrypoints/utils.py line 473
- Likely real
- Yes, 83% confidence
Detects fully silent process execution (suppressing all output channels) [threat-process-spawn-silent]
stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=stderr_file, ) -
- Engine
- GuardDog · Supply-chain attack heuristics
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/entrypoints/utils.py line 653
- Likely real
- Yes, 83% confidence
Detects fully silent process execution (suppressing all output channels) [threat-process-spawn-silent]
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, ) os.replace(merged_path, save_file_path) -
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/code_sync/install_github_cli.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/release/upload_zip_to_whl.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci/npu/npu_ci_install_dependency.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci/cuda/warmup_server.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci_monitor/ci_failures_analysis.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci/utils/diffusion/run_comparison.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci/utils/update_rerun_test_status.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci/utils/diffusion/generate_diffusion_dashboard.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci_monitor/ci_auto_bisect.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci/utils/install_protoc.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci/utils/publish_traces.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/release/README.md
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/playground/long_context_example.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/playground/reference_hf.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/playground/bench_speculative.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci_monitor/lark_notify.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/profiler.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /benchmark/hicache/bench_buffer_mode.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /benchmark/hicache/bench_serving.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /benchmark/mmlu/download_data.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /benchmark/blog_v0_2/405b_sglang.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /benchmark/blog_v0_2/README.md
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /benchmark/blog_v0_2/405b_vllm.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /benchmark/llava_bench/download_images.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /benchmark/llava_bench/README.md
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /benchmark/hicache/download.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /scripts/ci/utils/slash_command_handler.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.github/workflows/nightly-release-gateway.yml
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.github/workflows/_npu-single-node-test-stage.yml
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.github/workflows/release-pypi-gateway.yml
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.github/update_ci_permission.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /sgl-model-gateway/bindings/python/src/sglang_router/launch_server.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /sgl-model-gateway/e2e_test/infra/simple_eval_common.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /sgl-model-gateway/e2e_test/infra/process_utils.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /3rdparty/amd/wheel/sgl-kernel/build_rocm.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/pipelines_core/stages/model_specific_stages/minimax_h3/material_io.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/models/gemma3_mm.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/mem_cache/storage/mooncake_store/mooncake_store.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/mem_cache/storage/flexkv/verify_outputs.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/mem_cache/storage/npu_memcache/npu_memcache_store.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/entrypoints/http_server.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/observability/metrics.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/loader/component_loaders/vl_encoder_loader.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/disaggregation/request_state.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/model_loader/remote_instance_weight_loader_utils.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/runtime/utils/vision.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/.claude/skills/sglang-diffusion-benchmark-profile/scripts/bench_diffusion_denoise.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/.claude/skills/sglang-diffusion-benchmark-profile/benchmark-and-profile.md
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/benchmarks/datasets.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/benchmarks/bench_serving.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/multimodal_gen/apps/ComfyUI_SGLDiffusion/core/server_api.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/kernels/aot/Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/kernels/aot/kernel-runner-setup.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/arm64.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/rocm.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/npu.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.claude/skills/llm-torch-profiler-analysis/scripts/run_sglang_torch_profile_host.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /.claude/skills/llm-torch-profiler-analysis/scripts/run_trtllm_pytorch_profile_host.sh
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/dspark_sps_profiler.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/Dockerfile.cu134
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
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- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/sgl-deep-gemm.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/sgl-deep-ep.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/serving.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /docker/xeon.Dockerfile
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/one_batch_server.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/utils.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/compile_deep_gemm.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/utils.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/benchmark/endpoint.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
-
- Engine
- YARA · Malware signature rules
- Counts towards
- Malicious pattern
- File
- /python/sglang/srt/disaggregation/common/conn.py
- Likely real
- Probably noise, 0% confidence
YARA rule matched: detect_downloader — Downloads a remote resource - common and low-signal alone; see detect_download_and_execute for the composite version
No findings match these filters.